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ABSTRACT—In an important article in the Yale Law Journal, James
Pfander and Daniel Birk claim that adverseness is not required by Article
III for cases arising under federal law. This Article takes the position that
Pfander and Birk have not made the case for reconsidering adversity
requirements for Article III cases. Adverseness may be present when there
is adversity of legal interests, even when adverse argument is not present.
From this perspective, a number of Pfander and Birk’s examples of noncontentious jurisdiction manifested adverseness. In rem-type proceedings
such as bankruptcy and prize cases required the determination of adverse
interests, in situations where impediments often existed to voluntary
extrajudicial resolution. Service or notice in some form was generally
provided, which gave opportunities for adverse argument. In addition, the
issuance of warrants, while ex parte, involved adverse interests in a context
where predeprivation notice would undermine the utility of the proceeding,
notice occurred on execution of the warrant, and opportunity for argument
was then often available. Pfander and Birk’s examples of pension and
naturalization determinations are not as readily characterized as adverse.
The Court, however, treated federal judges’ pension determinations as
appropriate, if at all, as the work of individual commissioners rather than
Article III judges. Naturalization petitions are perhaps Pfander and Birk’s
best example of non-contentious jurisdiction, but the Court explicitly
approved the practice as appropriate under Article III only after provisions
for notice to, and potential appearance by, the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
“In every court,” Blackstone wrote in 1768, “there must be at least
three constituent parts, . . . : the actor, or plaintiff, who complains of an
injury done; the reus, or defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction
for it; and the judex, or judicial power.”1 In 1800, Representative John
Marshall interpreted the “Case[]”2 in Article III to incorporate a similar set
of requirements: “[t]here must be parties to come to court, who can be
reached by its process, and bound by its power; whose rights admit of
ultimate decision by a tribunal to which they are bound to submit.”3

1

3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25; see also 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF
LAWES OF ENGLAND 39 (London 1628) (“[I]n everie Judgement there ought to
be three persons, Actor, Reus, and Iudex.”); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of
Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1568 & n.29 (2002) (“For centuries, Anglo-American
lawyers have thought that the very existence of most kinds of judicial proceedings depends upon the
presence (actual or constructive) of adverse parties.”).
2
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
3
The Honorable John Marshall, Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives, of the United
States, on the Resolutions of the Hon. Edward Livingston, Relative to Thomas Nash, Alias Jonathan
Robbins (March 7, 1800), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82, 96 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984)
[hereinafter John Marshall Speech]; id. at 95 (“A case in law or equity . . . was a controversy between
parties which had taken a shape for judicial decision.”).
THE INSTITUTES OF THE
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Adverse Interests

Numerous Supreme Court decisions reiterate the need for parties with
adverse interests who will be bound by the results of the litigation.4
In addition, standing doctrine reflects the need for adverse interests
that will be affected by the litigation. Standing requires not only a plaintiff
who claims a legally cognizable interest that will be affected by the
controversy but also a defendant who has in some sense caused injury to
the plaintiff’s interests and can provide redress. The causation may consist
in the defendant’s having an adverse legal interest that the plaintiff seeks to
diminish or transfer to himself rather than that the defendant necessarily
has disturbed the status quo.5 Under existing doctrine, though, the fact that
Congress or a state legislature is willing to treat the parties as having
sufficient adverse interests does not automatically make it so.6
While several scholars have defended adversity as an Article III
requirement and criticized certain types of proceedings as failing to meet
it,7 the adversity requirement also has its critics.8 In an impressive article in
4

See, e.g., United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 46 (1852) (indicating that certain
determinations of treaty claims were not cases because, inter alia, the United States was not authorized
to appear as a party to oppose the claim); Marye v. Parsons, 114 U.S. 325, 330 (1885) (“[N]o court sits
to determine questions of law in thesi. There must be a litigation upon actual transactions between real
parties, growing out of a controversy affecting legal or equitable rights as to person or property.”);
California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893) (“The duty of this court, as of
every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons or of property, which are actually
controverted in the particular case before it.”); United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 588 (1899)
(determining that the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia could review the decision of the
Commissioner of Patents, and stating that “the proceeding in the Court of Appeals on an appeal in an
interference controversy presents all the features of a civil case, a plaintiff, a defendant and a judge”);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (stating that judicial power “is the right to
determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper
jurisdiction”); see also id. at 357 (indicating that a case requires “the existence of present or possible
adverse parties whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication” (quoting In re Pac. Ry.
Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 255 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887))).
5
See, e.g., HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §§ 192–195 (2d
ed. 1948) (describing actions to quiet title and to remove a cloud on title); id. § 194, at 523 (“Where
adverse possession has given title to the land, the adverse possessor may maintain the suit . . . [to quiet
title] against the holder of record title.”).
6
See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992) (rejecting the argument that “the injuryin-fact requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, selfcontained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law”);
Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 360–63 (dismissing a suit that Congress explicitly authorized to contest the
constitutionality of a congressional statute); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883)
(dismissing claims where state legislation authorized the state to sue on behalf of citizens holding bonds
of another state, stating that “one State cannot create a controversy with another State, within the
meaning of that term as used in the judicial clauses of the Constitution, by assuming the prosecution of
debts owing by the other State to its citizens”).
7
See, e.g., Ralph E. Avery, Article III and Title 11: A Constitutional Collision, 12 BANKR. DEV. J.
397, 400 (1996) (arguing that some of the main elements of the bankruptcy code do not comply with
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the Yale Law Journal, James Pfander and Daniel Birk claim that
adverseness is not required by Article III for “Cases” under federal law.9
Article III’s case or controversy requirement); Michael T. Morley, Consent of the Governed or Consent
of the Government? The Problems with Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant Cases, 16 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 637, 644–46 (2014) (criticizing consent decree practice as failing to satisfy adversity, and
recommending in government–defendant cases that the plaintiff be required to show an entitlement to
relief and that the remedy is necessary to redress the particular violation); id. at 641 n.16 (collecting
scholarship on consent decrees); Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions,
the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
545, 548–51 (2006) (providing historical and normative support for an adversity requirement, and
arguing that settlement class actions do not conform to this requirement because they are not adversary
at the time of filing); id. at 580 (arguing that if a case is adverse in the beginning, there is more
assurance that it was not brought primarily to bind future litigants); TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 85–88 (1969) (raising lack of adversity problems with surveillance
warrants). Redish and Kastanek provide a detailed normative rationale for an adversity requirement, see
Redish & Kastanek, supra, at 570–88, which this Article does not purport to provide.
8
There are numerous critiques of standing doctrine, and particularly the requirement of injury in
fact. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). Related to standing requirements is mootness doctrine, which
purports to require that the parties maintain an adequate stake throughout the litigation, not just at the
outset. See infra note 139. Because the Court has sometimes applied mootness doctrine loosely, many
articles take the position that mootness is subconstitutional. See, e.g., Matthew I. Hall, The Partially
Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 565–66 (2009) (arguing, based on
review of cases, that there is “personal stake mootness” and “issue mootness,” and only the latter is of
constitutional magnitude); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 609–10, 609 nn. 22–23, 610 n.24, 668 (1992) (arguing that the
Court’s mootness doctrine should be seen as subconstitutional, and casting doubt on the constitutional
status of justiciability doctrines generally); cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by
Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 247, 305–06 (1988) (arguing that a traditional personal stake should not be a constitutional
requirement in actions for a deterrent remedy). This Article does not address the range of standing and
mootness critiques.
9
James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement,
and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1357 (2015). In addition, Professor Pfander has
coauthored several related articles. See, e.g., James E. Pfander & Emily K. Damrau, A Non-Contentious
Account of Article III’s Domestic Relations Exception, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117, 118–21, 145–46,
163–65 (2016) (arguing that federal courts should be able to handle uncontested domestic relations
matters if they arise as federal question cases rather than diversity controversies, and could handle
contested domestic relations matters under diversity jurisdiction); James E. Pfander & Michael J.T.
Downey, In Search of the Probate Exception, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1533, 1538–39, 1551, 1556, 1579
(2014) (making a similar claim as to probate matters). Professor Pfander and his coauthors argue that
federal law “Cases” differ from diversity “Controversies” in that only the latter require adversity. See,
e.g., Pfander & Birk, supra, at 1357, 1424, 1442; Pfander & Downey, supra, at 1538–39; see also
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal
Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 449–50, 519 (1994) (arguing that, under the original meaning of
Article III, law exposition is the role of the federal courts in cases, while controversies focus on bilateral
disputes); id. at 450 (arguing that the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness are not
constitutionally required as to cases). Many scholars see cases as encompassing both civil and criminal
proceedings, while controversies include only civil proceedings. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203,
220 (1997); Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1575
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They rely on a statement by Chief Justice John Marshall, as well as a
similar statement by Justice Joseph Story, that federal courts may exercise
jurisdiction over cases “when the subject is submitted to it by a party who
asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.”10 The authors also provide
(1990). But cf. David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch,
1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 149 n.278 (finding evidence insufficient for a case/controversy distinction either
as to criminal/civil or as to law declaration/dispute resolution); Michael T. Morley, Non-Contentious
Jurisdiction and Consent Decrees, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 14 (2016) (arguing that the Constitution
uses “cases” and “controversies” interchangeably).
Pfander and Birk argue that this Article fails to grapple with their distinction between diversity
controversies, which would require adversity, and federal cases. James E. Pfander & Daniel Birk,
Adverse Interests and Article III: A Reply, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 1085–88 (2017) [hereinafter
Pfander & Birk Reply]. To the extent that this Article shows that many of the federal question
proceedings that the authors rely on as originally non-contentious—e.g., bankruptcy, prize, remissions,
and warrants—were in fact adverse, the result renders questionable the purported case/controversy
distinction that the authors seek to support. Cf. John Marshall Speech, supra note 3, at 95 (“A case in
law or equity was a term well understood, and of limited signification. It was a controversy between
parties which had taken a shape for judicial decision. If the judicial power extended to every question
under the constitution it would involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and
decision; if to every question under the laws and treaties of the United States it would involve almost
every subject on which the executive could act.”); infra note 18 & Section II.A (indicating federal
bankruptcy and diversity receiverships were treated comparably); infra note 119 (noting comparable
treatment of diversity and federal question shareholder actions).
10
Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1419, 1442, 1453 (quoting Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824)). Taken in context, there is nothing in the quoted statements from
Chief Justice Marshall or Justice Story that is inconsistent with an adverse party requirement. Chief
Justice Marshall’s statement was in the context of an adversarial dispute, and he gave an example
shortly after the above quoted language: “The suit of The Bank of the United States v. Osborn and
others, is a case, and the question is, whether it arises under a law of the United States?” Osborn,
22 U.S. at 819. The lack of inconsistency of the language quoted by Pfander and Birk with an adversity
requirement for cases is further shown in Marshall’s 1800 speech in the House of Representatives in
which he noted the need for adversity. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. That statement was
immediately preceded by a statement similar to Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in Osborn that a case
requires that a party “assert[] his rights in the form prescribed by law.” 22 U.S. at 819. Marshall
explained,
By extending the judicial power to all cases in law and equity, the constitution had never been
understood, to confer on that department, any political power whatever. To come within this
description, a question must assume a legal form, for forensic litigation, and judicial decision.
There must be parties to come into court, who can be reached by its process, and bound by its
power; whose rights admit of ultimate decision by a tribunal to which they are bound to submit.
John Marshall Speech, supra note 3, at 95–96 (emphasis added). But cf. Pfander & Birk Reply, supra
note 9, at 1069–70 & nn.10–11 (suggesting that Marshall’s statements as a representative should be
discounted in light of Marshall’s statement as a judge in Osborn); id. at 1070 (claiming that this Article
prefers “revisions of the Gilded Age to the choices of the Framers”).
The authors also rely on Justice Story’s statement, “A case, then, in the sense of this clause of the
constitution, arises when some subject touching the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States is
submitted to the courts by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.” Pfander & Birk,
supra note 9, at 1419 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1646, at 424 (photo. reprint 2005) (2d ed. 1851)). Justice Story cited, inter alia,
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numerous examples of what they call “non-contentious jurisdiction” in the
federal courts—essentially, instances when courts determine issues ex
parte.
After presenting their enumeration of non-contentious cases, Pfander
and Birk divide their examples into two categories: ancillary and original
non-contentious cases. The first category comprises “non-contentious
features . . . that are ancillary to an actual or potential dispute.”11 Their
ancillary category includes default judgments, consent decrees, and guilty
pleas.12 Given that these matters “arise in connection with a dispute
between actual or potential adversaries,”13 examples in the ancillary
category would not seem significantly to undermine an adversity
requirement.14 Their second category, “actions that are originally noncontentious,”15 presumably poses a greater threat to the adversity
requirement. The authors include in this category prize jurisdiction,16
remissions of fines,17 bankruptcies and equity receiverships,18 warrants,19
and benefits determinations such as petitions for pensions20 and for
citizenship.21

Osborn to support the proposition. STORY, supra, § 1646, at 424 n.2. As is true for Marshall’s similar
language, the Story quotation is not inconsistent with an adversity requirement.
11
Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1440.
12
Id. at 1441.
13
Id.
14
See id. at 1442–43 (indicating that courts can exercise ancillary non-contentious jurisdiction even
in diversity controversies). As noted infra text accompanying note 33, no one contends that
adversariness must pervade all issues in a lawsuit. This Article, therefore, does not focus on Pfander and
Birk’s examples of ancillary non-contentious jurisdiction.
15
Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1440.
16
Id. at 1446.
17
Id. at 1445.
18
Id. at 1441 & n.445. In later work, Pfander treats receiverships as in the ancillary category. See
Pfander & Damrau, supra note 9, at 145–46. This is perhaps because equity receiverships were under
the diversity jurisdiction, see infra note 123 and accompanying text, which Pfander and his coauthors
treat as requiring contention. See supra note 9. Pfander and Birk may be suggesting that it is the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings as well as equity receiverships that is non-contentious. See Pfander
& Birk, supra note 9, at 1441 (“In still other contexts, the party claims a right to invocation of
administrative or judicial machinery for the disposition of an estate, as in bankruptcy or the
appointment of an equity receiver.”). If “originally non-contentious” merely means that the actions
begin without personal service on an adverse party who will nevertheless receive some form of service
or notice thereafter, then even original non-contentious proceedings do not present a serious challenge
to adversity requirements.
19
Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1441.
20
Id. at 1361, 1364 (including pensions in the category of government benefits); id. at 1440–41
(including claims for entitlements to a benefit as original non-contentious proceedings).
21
Id. at 1441, 1447.

1030

111:1025 (2017)

Adverse Interests

In addition to providing examples and categories of non-contentious
cases, Pfander and Birk minimize the apparent importance of cases in
which the Court seemingly required adverseness. They argue that the
Court’s hostility to collusive cases was primarily directed against
“collusive proceedings that assume the form of contentious ones,” such as
where friendly parties attempted to obtain decisions that would prejudice
the rights of nonparties, or attempted to elicit constitutional precedent.22
Pfander and Birk argue that the Court’s criticism of such proceedings did
not manifest a broader requirement of adverseness.23 Similarly, they argue
that federal judges’ apparent hostility to hearing ex parte pension
applications, as manifested in Hayburn’s Case,24 was principally directed
against political branch review of judicial decisions rather than to the lack
of adverseness.25
Pfander and Birk ultimately claim that we should expand our notions
of what constitutes a case to include non-contentious proceedings.26 Thus,
in line with others who cast doubts on the Court’s justiciability doctrines,27
they would ultimately give more power to Congress to expand federal court
jurisdiction.28
This Article takes the position that Pfander and Birk, while having
significantly contributed to scholars’ appreciation of the many ex parte
matters handled by the federal courts, have not made the case for
reconsidering adversity requirements for Article III cases.29 This Article
addresses Pfander and Birk’s principal historical examples of original non22

See id. at 1433.
Id. (“[T]he decisions that restrict the use of collusive cases do not actually question the power of
the federal courts to hear non-contentious proceedings in general, but only collusive proceedings that
assume the form of contentious ones.”).
24
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
25
Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1432.
26
Id. at 1357, 1473.
27
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 235–36.
28
Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1473–74. Their most tangible result would be to give Congress
greater leeway to assign to Article III courts the determination of ex parte claims, such as uncontested
determinations of benefits. See id. at 1449–50. As to constitutional cases, they seem to think contention
is preferable but not constitutionally required. See id. at 1455.
29
Professor Morley has also written a reply to Pfander and Birk, arguing that “for a case or
controversy to exist, the interested parties must not have . . . reached an affirmative agreement on all
issues.” Morley, supra note 9, at 3. Unlike this Article, Professor Morley does not dispute Pfander and
Birk’s historical evidence. See id. at 2. Rather, he claims that early Court practice is a “surprisingly
unreliable guide in interpreting Article III.” Id. at 4–8 (providing examples). He is particularly
concerned with establishing that many consent decrees raise serious Article III concerns, as he argued
in his prior Article, see Morley, supra note 7, and that this is true even under the framework proposed
by Pfander and Birk. Morley, supra note 9, at 3, 9.
23
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contentious jurisdiction including in rem-type proceedings such as
bankruptcies, equity receiverships, prize, and remission of fines; warrants;
and benefits determinations such as petitions for pensions and citizenship.
In addition, the Article responds to Pfander and Birk’s arguments that the
Court’s hostility to collusive proceedings was of limited significance and
that Court’s resistance to pension cases should be seen as focused on
political branch review.
Part I defines the adversity requirement as a requirement of adversity
of legal interests rather than necessarily adversity of legal arguments. As is
evident in default judgments, unopposed transfers of legal interests are not
necessarily voluntary transfers,30 and judgments are often required for such
transfers whether or not adverse parties appear. Multilateral claims upon
limited assets face additional hurdles to voluntary extrajudicial resolution.
Part II shows that in rem-type proceedings involved adverse legal interests
and often evoked adverse argument. Part III considers warrants, where the
utility of the procedure would be lost by pre-deprivation notice, and later
opportunity for adverse arguments was generally available, at least as an
historical matter. Part IV discusses how judicial hostility to collusive
proceedings should not be read so narrowly as Pfander and Birk contend.
Part V addresses pensions and naturalization. As to pensions, the evidence
does not support treating judges’ objections to pension work as focused
only on nonjudicial review. Such pension work as the judges performed,
moreover, was done as commissioners. Naturalization is perhaps the
authors’ best example of a non-contentious proceeding, but the Court only
explicitly approved the practice as within Article III after amendments to
the statutes provided notice and opportunity to be heard in the United
States.
I.

DISTINGUISHING ADVERSE LEGAL INTERESTS
AND ADVERSE ADVOCACY
A.

Adverse Interests and Adverse Arguments

In evaluating whether adverseness is required by Article III, one
should distinguish two aspects of adverseness. One is a requirement of
adverse legal interests that will be affected by a decree. Another is a
requirement of adverse advocacy interests or adverse legal arguments. A
prototypical case involves some issues as to which the parties have both
adverse legal interests as well as adverse arguments. Adverse legal
30

See Morley, supra note 9, at 10 (“Thus, a meaningful distinction exists between mere lack of
opposition and affirmative consent.”).
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arguments, however, are clearly not sufficient for a case, nor are they
always necessary. By contrast, adverse legal interests are necessary and
often sufficient. The most plausible version of the adverseness requirement
is that a case requires a clash of legal interests but does not always require a
clash of argument.31
B.

Involuntary Termination of Legal Interests Often Requires a Judgment

To tease out why having adverse interests—but not adverse
arguments—is a requirement for a case, consider two of Pfander and Birk’s
examples of non-contentious proceedings: defaults and bankruptcy.32 The
characteristics of defaults and bankruptcies will reappear in other examples
of supposed non-contentious proceedings and illustrate the need for adverse
legal interests even if adverse argument might be dispensable.
Even in a typical bilateral case with adverse legal interests and
arguments, no one would claim that the parties must make adverse legal
arguments on all issues. Indeed, both older pleading practices and modern
procedure have encouraged the narrowing of issues.33 But what if the
parties, at least as far as the court is concerned, apparently disagree about
nothing? For example, in an ordinary contract dispute in which a creditor
sues a debtor, the debtor may have no defense. If the creditor sues the
debtor and the debtor is served, the debtor may default34 or agree to entry of
a consent judgment. If the defendant is not prepared to defend, why don’t
the parties merely arrange their affairs contractually without a lawsuit?35
31

This formulation is Caleb Nelson’s. Caleb Nelson, Commentary on James Pfander’s The
Contested History of Article III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement, at the Hugh and Hazel Darling
Foundation Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference, University of San Diego School of Law (Feb.
20–21, 2015), http://www.sandiego.edu/law/centers/csco/webcasts/2015.php [https://perma.cc/2P2KXK3F]; cf. Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend
Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 907, 912–13 (2011) (noting the frequency of
Supreme Court cases in which only one party appeared before the Court prior to 1954).
32
Pfander and Birk characterize defaults as ancillary non-contentious proceedings and characterize
bankruptcies as original non-contentious proceedings. Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1440–41; cf. id.
at 1371 (stating that bankruptcy “has long featured a combination of both adverse and non-adverse
proceedings”). As noted above, Pfander and Birk’s category of ancillary non-contentious proceedings
presents less of a challenge to adversity requirements than original non-contentious proceedings. See
supra note 14 and accompanying text. To the extent that in rem-type proceedings such as bankruptcies
(original) exhibit similar characteristics to defaults (ancillary), such original non-contentious
proceedings also do not present a significant challenge to Article III adversity requirements.
33
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(C) (indicating that the pretrial conference should consider
“obtaining admissions and stipulations about facts and documents to avoid unnecessary proof”).
34
Cf. Nelson, supra note 1, at 1569–72 (discussing historical support for the necessity of acquiring
jurisdiction over the defendant, and the development of default and attachment proceedings).
35
Cf. Redish & Kastanek, supra note 7, at 577 (suggesting that if the parties come to a court in
agreement, they have no need for a judgment rather than a contract unless they are trying to bind third
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Among other reasons, the debtor may lack any hard-edged compulsion
to surrender his legal interests and admit liability without a lawsuit.36 Even
lacking a defense to a contract claim, the debtor will not necessarily
voluntarily make himself amenable to the equivalent of judgment
enforcement. For example, he may not hand over a portion of his wages
that would be subject to garnishment in the event of a judgment.37
Consider, too, a multilateral dispute in which a distressed debtor has
multiple creditors. Creditors may be unwilling voluntarily to give up their
claims without the compulsion of legal proceedings, even if they have little
chance of receiving satisfaction.38 Nonjudicial, contractual solutions are
further complicated when the insolvent debtor has numerous creditors
whose interests in any remaining assets of the debtor would best be
adjusted simultaneously.39 This scenario for bankruptcy is typical of
limited-fund and in rem proceedings (collectively referred to herein as in
rem-type proceedings), which are familiar to the law of civil procedure.40
Such in rem-type proceedings necessarily include the potential for a
form of default, just as in personam actions do. Despite provisions for

parties). While some jurisdictions require “demand letters,” particularly in contract claims, as a
prerequisite to suit, a plaintiff generally is not required to show an attempt at voluntary agreement as a
precondition to filing suit.
36
See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility in the Law of Torts,
in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 251, 265–66 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012) (indicating
that the obligation to provide redress in tort law arises from a power given to the victim to impose a
liability on the defendant that is distinguishable from the primary right not to be injured and the
defendant’s duty not to injure). A contractual obligation generally entails a duty to satisfy the contract
without a judgment, but a party nevertheless may decline, or be unable, to perform.
37
Obtaining a judgment will also establish priority over other later judgments. Priority can
sometimes be established contractually through grant of a security interest. Sometimes one cannot
establish priority contractually. For example, there are restrictions on the assignment of wages.
38
In addition, loan forgiveness may lead to unfavorable tax consequences for the debtor. See, e.g.,
26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (2012).
39
See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 106 (1984) (“Bankruptcy law, at bottom, is designed to require these investors to
act collectively rather than to take individual actions that are not in the interests of the investors as a
group.”).
40
Cf. Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts and State
Law, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 296 (2009) (concluding that among small businesses, the use of federal
bankruptcy as opposed to state procedures—such as assignments for the benefit of creditors—results
from “bargaining failure between the business and its senior lenders”); id. at 259 (indicating that the
functions traditionally assigned to bankruptcy are “remedying collective action and other coordination
problems”).
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notice,41 some or all creditors might decline to file claims, based on their
view of costs and benefits.42 Indeed, parties who did not receive notice but
as to whom reasonable notice was attempted under existing procedural due
process requirements may have their interests altered in the bankruptcy
proceeding given the perceived need to resolve claims to the estate in one
proceeding.43
Both when a debtor defaults in a suit by a creditor and when a creditor
fails to make a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, an unopposed transfer of
legal interests is not necessarily the same thing as a voluntary transfer.44
Securing an unconsented transfer of legal interests often requires a
judgment. A valid judgment will require notice comporting with existing
procedural due process requirements. Ordinary defaults and bankruptcy
proceedings thus share the following characteristics: (1) a need to make a
conclusive determination of adverse legal interests that cannot readily be
accomplished by voluntary extrajudicial action, (2) requirements of notice
comporting with procedural due process requirements, and (3) the ability to
make a conclusive determination, even if the owners of opposing interests
fail to appear to make adverse arguments.45
41

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002 (listing rules for notice to creditors and others); FED. R. BANKR. P.
2002(l) (providing publication notice if notice by mail is not feasible); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (2012)
(providing that unscheduled debts are not generally discharged).
42
See Morley, supra note 7, at 671 (stating that in uncontested bankruptcies, as in defaults, the
“underlying adverseness is not eliminated by the fact that a creditor might not find it economically
worthwhile to contest”); cf. Redish & Kastanek, supra note 7, at 587 n.157 (arguing that because
creditors are always potential adversaries in bankruptcy, an advance determination of adversariness may
be impossible). In addition, creditors do not have to file a proof of claim if the debtor is in Chapter 11
and the debt is not disputed, contingent, or unliquidated. See § 501(a); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c).
43
In certain mass tort bankruptcies, the plans purport to alter the rights of people whose injuries
have not yet manifested themselves. The bankruptcy court will appoint a representative for future
claimants. See Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573,
1576–77, 1576 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995) (discussing different tests courts have used to determine if future
claimants have cognizable claims); § 524(g)–(h) (providing that plans may include trusts for future
asbestos claimants, and that courts may appoint a representative).
44
See Morley, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that lack of opposition and consent are not the same); id.
(arguing that in some of Pfander and Birk’s examples, “the whole reason that litigation exists in the first
place is because the opposing party will not consent to the relief the plaintiff seeks”).
45
While Pfander and Birk claim that this Article provides no criteria for applying its adverse
interest requirements, see Pfander & Birk Reply, supra note 9, at 1085–88, this Article suggests that
disputes that proceed ex parte tend to share the characteristics of defaults and in rem-type proceedings
noted above. Warrants have similar characteristics of a need to affect adverse interests that cannot
easily be adjusted by agreement, and requirements of notice comporting with procedural due process.
See infra text accompanying notes 83–85. Pfander and Birk suggest that the lack of actual notice to the
affected parties in some prize cases undermines the coherency of this account. See Pfander & Birk
Reply, supra note 9, at 1086. Notice that complies with procedural due process, however, may of course
fail to give actual notice. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15
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II.

IN REM AND LIMITED-FUND PROCEEDINGS

Pfander and Birk give several in rem-type proceedings as examples of
original non-contentious proceedings: bankruptcies, receiverships, prize
cases, and remissions of forfeitures. All of these proceedings share with
defaults the characteristics noted above and do not undermine an
adverseness requirement.
A.

Bankruptcy and Equity Receiverships

Pfander and Birk treat bankruptcy and equity receiverships as original
non-contentious proceedings in the federal courts; bankruptcy has been
addressed in Part I. Federal bankruptcy statutes, however, were short-lived
before 1898, and larger corporations did not frequently use the bankruptcy
statutes prior to certain enactments in the late 1930s.46 Before then, federal
court equity receiverships served as a vehicle for corporate reorganizations
of their debt structure.47 Both bankruptcy and equity receiverships required
notice to those with potential claims;48 they also manifested the need for,
and the ability of the court to make, a conclusive determination even if
adverse parties do not appear.
B.

Prize Jurisdiction

Prize jurisdiction in admiralty has similar characteristics: the need for
a resolution, notice comporting with due process, and the ability to enter a
final decree even absent the appearance of those with adverse interests. The
laws of war traditionally allowed, during hostilities, the seizure of enemy
(1950). That cases involving adverse interests may proceed even absent adverse parties results from the
perceived necessity of making a determination, rather than from the desirability of ex parte proceedings.
46
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 3–4
(2001) (noting that bankruptcy laws enacted in 1800, 1841, and 1867 were short-lived, but that the 1898
law had “staying power”); id. at 48 (indicating that while the Act of 1867, after an 1874 amendment, as
well as the 1898 Act, included corporate bankruptcy, those acts were rarely used by large corporations).
47
See id. at 101 (indicating that the Chandler Act of 1938 and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939
brought more corporate insolvency and reorganization proceedings under the federal statute, and
“decimated existing [corporate] reorganization practice”); id. at 125–27 (indicating that corporations
eventually would turn to Chapter 11 reorganization to allow managers to retain control of the
corporation).
48
See James Byrne, The Foreclosure of Railroad Mortgages in the United States Courts, in SOME
LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 77, 96 (1917)
(indicating that as part of the receivership order, or immediately thereafter, orders were entered, inter
alia, “requiring all creditors to present claims to a designated master before a fixed date; and directing
that notice be published in certain newspapers; that a copy of the order be mailed to creditors who are
on the books of the company; that any creditor be allowed to object to the claim of any other creditor;
and that a hearing be had before the master on the date fixed in the order or on such other date as the
master may name”).
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armed vessels as well as enemy commercial ships and cargo.49 In addition,
American and neutral ships could be subject to seizure for violating the
nonintercourse laws and American embargoes.50 When the seizing party,
whether a government officer or a privateer, brought the vessel into port,
the determination of interests typically proceeded by libel as part of the
prize jurisdiction of the federal courts.51
Such libel proceedings are in rem52 and adjudicate conflicting legal
interests among claimants to particular property, similar to bankruptcy.
Parties with claims on the vessel and cargo are potentially adverse to one
another. To be sure, in prize cases, the parties were characterized
differently than in an in personam suit. At least as a formal matter, the
seized ship was the defendant.53 Service was on the ship; “when the

49

RUFUS WAPLES, A TREATISE ON PROCEEDINGS IN REM § 292, at 394 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co.
1882) (“The general rule is that belligerents have a right to make prize of each other’s property found
upon the high seas; and to this rule there are but few exceptions.”).
50
See, e.g., 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–1815, at 409–10 (1981)
(indicating that forfeitures under the Non-Intercourse Acts, enacted from 1798 through 1800 during the
“Quasi-War” with France, were primarily imposed on residents of the United States); Act of Apr. 18,
1806, ch. 29, § 1, 2 Stat. 379, 379 (prohibiting generally the importation of certain goods from Great
Britain, Ireland, and the British colonies); Embargo Act of 1807, ch. 5, § 1, 2 Stat. 451, 451–52 (placing
an embargo on all ships within the United States bound for any foreign place, although allowing
departure of foreign vessels when notified of the Act); Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, ch. 24, § 1, 2 Stat.
528, 528 (interdicting British and French vessels from the territory of the United States); id. § 2, 2 Stat.
at 528–29 (forbidding citizens and residents of the United States from intercourse with such vessels); id.
§ 4, 2 Stat. at 529 (forbidding importation from France and Great Britain, with certain exceptions for
American vessels).
51
See ERASTUS C. BENEDICT, THE AMERICAN ADMIRALTY: ITS JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE,
§§ 510–511, at 282–83 (photo. reprint 2009) (1850) (discussing the requirement that the captor
immediately give notice to the commissioner or judge when the captor came into port, and turn over all
documents, and that the captor must produce one or more of the persons captured as witnesses whose
depositions with the ship’s papers were sealed and transmitted to the clerk of court).
52
See, e.g., Jennings v. Carson, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 2, 23 (1807) (“The proceedings of [admiralty]
court are in rem, and their sentences act on the thing itself.”); BENEDICT, supra note 51, § 359, at 201–
02; see also Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446, 2467 (2016)
(discussing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827), an in rem forfeiture proceeding). Damages
actions for captures without probable cause, however, were in personam. See BENEDICT, supra note 51,
§ 362, at 202–03; id. § 509, at 282.
53
See Jennings, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 24 (characterizing the proceedings as against the ship);
WAPLES, supra note 49, § 1, at 2 (stating that proceedings in rem treat property “as the defendant,
susceptible of being tried and condemned, while the owner merely gets notice, along with the rest of the
world, and may appear for his property or not”); cf. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND
MARITIME LAW § 1-2, at 9 (5th ed. 2012) (indicating that current in rem admiralty actions continue to
personify the vessel).
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proceeding is against a ship, the process commences with a warrant
directing the arrest of the ship.”54 There was also notice by publication.55
Because the ship was deemed the defendant, both the captors and
other claimants were the actors or plaintiffs and could initiate
proceedings,56 and all were seen as adverse to one another. Indeed, the
entire world was deemed adverse. Justice Story adverted to the binding
nature of in rem forfeiture on the world, and stated, “The reasonableness of
this doctrine results from the very nature of proceedings in rem. All persons
having an interest in the subject matter, whether as seizing officers, or
informers, or claimants, are parties or may be parties to such suits, so far as
their interest extends.”57
54

Jennings, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 24 (citing 2 ARTHUR BROWNE, A COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE
CIVIL LAW, AND OF THE LAW OF THE ADMIRALTY 397 (1802)); see also BENEDICT, supra note 51,
§ 365, at 204 (stating that notice is necessary to bind individuals, and that in proceedings in rem “notice
is served upon the thing itself”); WAPLES, supra note 49, § 42, at 54 (“What citation is, in a personal
civil action, seizure is in the actio in rem, so far as it is notice to all interested.”); id. § 65, at 89
(indicating that seizure is sufficient notice to owners, based on the presumption “that every man knows
whether his lands are in the adverse possession of another”); cf. Rule IX, Rules of Practice of the Courts
of the United States in Causes of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction, 44 U.S. (3 How.) i, v (1845) (“In
all cases of seizure and in other suits and proceedings in rem, the process, unless otherwise provided for
by statute, shall be by a warrant of arrest of the ship, goods or other thing to be arrested, and the
marshal . . . shall cause public notice thereof and of the time assigned for the return of such process and
the hearing of the cause to be given in such newspaper within the district as the District Court shall
order . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. C (providing for the arrest of the vessel in proceedings in rem);
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 53, § 14-3, at 895–97 (describing in rem procedures for arrest of the vessel,
followed by publication if the vessel has not been released); George Rutherglen, The Contemporary
Justification for Maritime Arrest and Attachment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 549 (1989) (criticizing
aspects of maritime arrest in general, but noting that “the lack of notice after arrest poses only
theoretical problems in most cases”).
55
See Kevin Arlyck, Forged by War: The Federal Courts and Foreign Affairs in the Age of
Revolution 123 (Sept. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with the
Northwestern University Law Review) (stating that under standard procedure in admiralty, the court in a
particular case “issued a writ of attachment against the vessel and a monition directing any interested
parties to show cause why the libel should not be sustained”); see also WAPLES, supra note 49, § 64, at
88 (“Notice in actions in rem is doubly given: by seizure and by publication.”); id. § 70, at 95
(indicating that publication of notice of admiralty proceedings is called a monition); cf. Nelson, supra
note 1, at 1572 (discussing the development of quasi in rem proceedings in England, and the importance
of the “purported issuance and attempted service” on the defendant, even if the summons were “not
actually delivered in a way that the defendant would learn of it”); id. at 1573–74 (discussing similar
requirements of a summons or voluntary appearance in the United States).
56
Jennings, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 23; Kevin Arlyck, Plaintiffs v. Privateers: Litigation and Foreign
Affairs in the Federal Courts, 1816–1822, 30 L. & HIST. REV. 245, 265–66 (2012) (discussing various
cases where those claiming ownership initiated libels); Arlyck, supra note 55, at 157 (discussing cases
filed by British consuls as to ships captured by French privateers and brought into United States ports);
cf. id. at 211 (noting that privateers’ violations of American neutrality could justify restoration to the
owners).
57
Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 312–13 (1818); see also id. at 313 (“The decree of the
court acts upon the thing in controversy, and settles the title of the property itself, the right of seizure,
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One might object that in a proceeding lacking personal service and
making the entire world adversaries, the proceedings would end up without
anyone contesting the libel. And that was indeed sometimes the case.58 The
arrest of the ship as part of the libel proceeding, however, generally gave
notice to the master of the captured vessel, and the courts treated the master
as the representative of the owners of the vessel, cargo,59 and insurers.60
Accordingly, masters, as well as the owners of vessels and cargos,61 and
and the question of forfeiture. If its decree were not binding upon all the world upon the points which it
professes to decide, the consequences would be most mischievous to the public. In case of
condemnation no good title to the property could be conveyed, and no justification of the seizure could
be asserted under its protection.”).
58
Pfander and Birk cite Kevin Arlyck’s thesis for the proposition that early prize claims were often
nonadversarial, which Arlyck attributed to the fact that there was nothing to litigate. See Pfander &
Birk, supra note 9, at 1369 & n.93; Arlyck, supra note 55, at 260–64 (particularly describing
occurrences during the War of 1812). The procedures mentioned above, see supra note 51, for securing
the ship’s papers and taking depositions might have supplied conclusive evidence that the ships were
subject to condemnation—particularly when the ships were enemy vessels. See WAPLES, supra note 49,
§ 95, at 132 (suggesting that the evidence taken from enemy captured officers and others would seldom
be helped by further proof). Arlyck also suggests that because the proceedings moved quickly it may
have been difficult for owners to arrange representation. See Arlyck, supra note 55, at 264; see also
WAPLES, supra note 49, § 309, at 409 (explaining that enemy owners had no standing in court, but that
such an owner could make an appearance “by an agent or attorney, and deny that he is an enemy, that
his property is enemy property, that it has been used by the enemy or captured from the enemy”); cf.
McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259, 266–68 (1870) (holding it was error for the federal
court to have entered a decree pro confesso when counsel for an alleged enemy entered an appearance
in a forfeiture action); id. at 267 (indicating alien enemies who can be sued have a right to defend);
WAPLES, supra note 49, § 371, at 468 (discussing McVeigh on this point).
Whether or not owners appeared, however, a court order was needed as a prerequisite to a valid sale
of the ships and goods. See supra note 57; Arlyck, supra note 55, at 258–59. The libel action could also
provide for the distribution of the proceeds among the captors. See Arlyck, supra note 55, at 258–59.
59
See, e.g., The Hiram, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 444, 445 (1814) (indicating that the master claimed the
vessel on behalf of the owner, and the supercargo [generally a representative of the cargo owners on
board a ship] claimed the cargo on behalf of Griffith and various other shippers); The Rapid, 12 U.S.
(8 Cranch) 155, 155 (1814) (listing the master in the caption of a contested prize case); The Admiral,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 603, 611 (1865) (indicating that the master filed a claim on behalf of the British ship
owners and the New Brunswick cargo owners).
60
The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 146 (1815) (indicating that the insurers were considered
parties through the master (citing Croudson v. Leonard, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 434, 437 (1808)). On the
particular facts, however, the cargo owners were not foreclosed from seeking remission by the ship
owners’ failing to contest the seizure which resulted in the vessel’s condemnation. Id. at 146–47. The
owners may have failed to appear due to the worthlessness of the ship to them, given that it was subject
to a bottomry bond. Id. A bottomry bond pledges a ship as security for repairs, and the debt is generally
cancelled if the ship is lost on the same voyage.
61
See, e.g., Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 6 (1794) (indicating that after a vessel
had been captured by a French privateer, “the owners of the sloop and her cargo filed a libel in the
District Court of Maryland, claiming restitution, because the vessel belonged to subjects of the king of
Sweden, a neutral power, and the cargo was owned, jointly by Swedes and Americans”); The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S (2 Black) 635, 637–38 (1863) (describing various parties seeking restoration of their
ships); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 679 (1900) (indicating that as to both fishing vessels at issue
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consular officials commonly appeared in the litigation as parties.62
Contested prize cases were frequent,63 and the failure to appear was treated
as a default.64 To the extent some interested parties did not receive notice or
faced other difficulties in making an appearance, the proceedings
nevertheless met then-existing procedural due process requirements, where
service of the property and publication sufficed.65 Indeed, that some owners
of adverse interests were outside the court’s in personam jurisdiction likely
contributed to the perceived necessity of proceeding against the property.66

in prize cases, a claim was interposed by the master on behalf of himself and the crew, and of the
owner).
62
See, e.g., The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52, 52–53 (1819) (indicating that the Spanish
consul was claiming restitution of a ship that Buenos Ayres rebels had seized as enemy property/prize);
cf. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 67–68 (1825) (prize case in which vice-consuls of Spain and
Portugal sought return of captured slaves as property of their citizens); The Santa Maria, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 431, 432 (1825) (prize case where the Spanish consul sued for restitution on behalf of the
original owners); BENEDICT, supra note 51, at 435 (providing a form in which a consul says he believes
libeled property is British); Arlyck, supra note 56, at 245–47 (recounting successes of consular officials
in obtaining restoration of ships seized by privateers authorized by South American revolutionary
governments, who had violated the federal neutrality law); id. at 263–64 (indicating that a consul could
initiate proceedings “without specific authorization from the property owners”); id. at 265 (noting that
consuls pressed both large and small claims).
63
See, e.g., The Joseph, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 451 (1814); The Sally, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 382 (1814);
The St. Lawrence, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 434 (1814); see also Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1395
(“[T]he seized ship’s owner, captain, or crew could potentially (and sometimes did) appear to contest
condemnation of the prize.”). See generally William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty
Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 150 (1993)
(discussing the many prize cases in the Supreme Court from 1789–1801).
64
See The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 143 (characterizing the failure of American owners to show
up to contest a forfeiture as “contumacy”); WAPLES, supra note 49, § 2, at 3 (stating requirements of all
in rem actions include: “7. Notice of seizure and libel must be given to the world, if the world is to be
bound by the decree. 8. Opportunity for filing claims, interventions and answers must be afforded. 9.
Default should be entered against all non-appearers”); id. § 95, at 132 (indicating that in prize cases, the
evidence, generally taken “from the captured officers and others of the prize,” will be presented to the
court though no one may have appeared); BENEDICT, supra note 51, §§ 449–52 (discussing defaults); cf.
Stratton v. Jarvis, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 4, 8–9 (1834) (describing procedures of a libel for salvage and
reflecting an expectation that property owners would appear).
65
See WAPLES, supra note 49, § 64, at 89 (indicating that the presumption of notice might in many
cases be incorrect, “but the presumption is necessary to the very existence of proceedings in rem [and
t]he cases of hardship are comparatively few, while the benefits of this mode of procedure are so great
that it would be almost impossible to enforce our revenue and navigation laws, liens in admiralty, and
many statute rights, without the use of it”).
66
See supra note 57 and accompanying text; WAPLES, supra note 49, § 308, at 408 (“Why, since
the right to condemn is always found in the hostility implied from ownership, must the proceedings
always be in rem? Because we have no jurisdiction over a public enemy so as to sue him in
personam.”); id. § 625, at 772 (“And whatever there may be of apparent injustice in the system, there is
another side from which it may be viewed where the injustice of refusing the action is very much more
apparent.”).

1040

111:1025 (2017)

Adverse Interests

C.

Remission of Forfeitures

A variety of embargo, revenue, and customs laws provided for
forfeiture of ships and goods involved in violation of those laws.67 Some
forfeiture proceedings were part of the prize jurisdiction.68 Whether or not
involving prize, forfeitures generally proceeded as in rem libel actions.69
Statutes also provided that the party whose property had been subject to
forfeiture could seek a remission, that is, forgiveness of the forfeitures in
whole or part.70 The remission procedure was often seen as a continuation
of the in rem forfeiture proceedings because the remission affected the
distribution of the property in the hands of the court.71
A libel and remission might proceed as follows. Customs officials of a
particular port seized ships and goods for violations of the embargo or
customs laws. At the instance of the seizing officials, the District Attorney
for the United States then brought the libel or forfeiture proceeding.72
Customs officials had strong incentives to participate in the proceedings
because they would be entitled to a half (moiety) or some other portion of
the proceeds if the court held the goods forfeit.73
After a court determined the property was subject to forfeiture but
before the distribution of proceeds, an owner might file in the libeling court
a petition for remission. The remissions were governed by statute which
67

See Nelson, supra note 52, at 2465–66.
See, e.g., The Mary, 12 US (8 Cranch) at 389–92 (involving prize and a remission).
69
An application for remission of a penalty presumably might proceed in personam. Notice would
still be given to the government and the officers. See, e.g., Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122.
70
See, e.g., id.
71
See United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 292 (1825) (stating that the “suit, or
prosecution, does not end with the judgment, but embraces the execution,” which could be affected by a
remission after the judgment); M’Lane v. United States, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 404, 424 (1832) (“Where a
sentence of condemnation has been finally pronounced in a case of seizure, the court, as an incident to
the possession of the principal cause, has a right to proceed to decree a distribution of the proceeds,
according to the terms prescribed by law.”).
72
The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 458 (1868) (stating that while the libel mentioned
the name of the informer, the suits were initiated by the District Attorney for the United States);
BENEDICT, supra note 51, at 546–51 (providing examples of libels brought by the District Attorney of
the United States for the Southern District of New York).
73
See Morris, 23 U.S. at 290–91 (noting the duty of the collector to prosecute the claims on behalf
of the government and that while customs officers were parties in interest, they were subordinate to the
United States as the formal party); The Princess of Orange, 19 F. Cas. 1336, 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1831) (No.
11,431) (explaining that the collector of customs confiscated smuggled jewels and diamonds, and
“directed the district attorney to prosecute the goods for condemnation”); cf. Dorsheimer v. United
States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 166, 166 (1868) (indicating as to the internal revenue laws, that the collectors
have authority to prosecute for recovery of fines and forfeitures on behalf of the United States, and that
the collector or deputy collector to first inform would receive a moiety (citing Act of June 30, 1864, ch.
173, § 179, 13 Stat. 223, 305)).
68
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prescribed standards by which the Secretary of the Treasury could grant
them, such as the lack of “wilful negligence or any intention of fraud” by
the owner.74 The court made fact-findings relevant to this standard and
forwarded them to the Secretary.75 The Secretary’s determination of
remission was returned to the court administering the forfeiture, such that
the determination would generally control the disposition of the property.
The Secretary’s remission determination, if within statutory authority,
foreclosed not only the interest of the United States but also that of the
customs officials in their moiety of the remitted amounts.76 The ability of
the Secretary to foreclose the interests of seizing officials resulted from the
Court’s seeing the rights of forfeiture and remission as belonging to the
United States rather than to the customs officials.77
The back and forth between the Court and the Secretary of Treasury
may appear violative of rules against executive review of judicial
determinations.78 Whatever their other constitutional defects, however, the
judges’ proceedings generally did not lack adversity. The initial remission
statute provided:
[T]he said judge shall inquire in a summary manner into the circumstances of
the case, first causing reasonable notice to be given to the person or persons
claiming such fine, penalty or forfeiture, and to the attorney of the United
States for such district, that each may have an opportunity of showing cause
against the mitigation or remission thereof . . . .79

74

Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 122–23; see also Act of Feb. 27, 1813, ch. 33, § 1,
2 Stat. 804, 805 (directing the Secretary of the Treasury to remit all forfeitures, penalties, and fines for
bona fide American property brought to the country after the declaration of war in a nonclandestine
manner).
75
See Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 285 (“The facts are submitted to the Secretary, for the sole
purpose of enabling him to form an opinion, whether there was willful negligence, or intentional
fraud . . . .”); The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 722 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 9,072) (discussing the
necessity of transmission of the statement of facts by the judge to the Secretary).
76
See Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 292, 296 (indicating that the United States could grant
remission even after condemnation).
77
Id.
78
Cf. Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV.
123, 133 (characterizing remissions actions as “truly judicial” even though they “did not involve the
decision of cases or controversies”).
79
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 122; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 13, § 1,
1 Stat. 506, 506 (containing a similar notice provision); Act of Jan. 2, 1813, ch. 7, § 1, 2 Stat. 789, 789–
90 (referring to persons petitioning under the Act of March 3, 1797); Act of Feb. 27, 1813, ch. 33, § 1,
2 Stat. 804, 805 (same); cf. M’Lane v. United States, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 404, 406–07, 424–25 (1832)
(statement of facts showing notice to the collector, in a proceeding under the Act of July 29, 1813,
giving the ship owners the same benefits as under the Act of Jan. 2, 1813 (citing Act of July 29, 1813,
ch. 34, § 1, 6 Stat. 122, 122)). Pfander and Birk advert to the notice provision in the 1790 statute, but
state, “the district judge could proceed to assemble a factual record even where no adverse party came
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Despite their claims being seen as more or less derivative of the
government’s, the customs officials were considered parties in interest with
a right to appear before the judge to contest the petitioner’s request for
remission even if the United States favored it.80 In M’Lane v. United States,
for example, the collector was given notice and presented a protest, and
that protest was appended to the judge’s fact-findings forwarded to the
Secretary.81 Even after the Secretary’s order of remission, the officers in
M’Lane successfully argued in the court that a certain part of the proceeds
was not statutorily remittable.82
* * *

Pfander and Birk provided as historical examples of original noncontentious proceedings a number of in rem-type proceedings:
bankruptcies, receiverships, prize, and remissions. Such proceedings,
however, all responded to a need to resolve conflicting claims to property
that were difficult to adjust by agreement, provided service comporting
with procedural due process, and could affect claims to the property even if
parties failed to appear. In addition, those with adverse interests frequently
appeared to make adverse arguments. The in rem-type proceedings do not
undermine the need for adverse legal interests as a requirement for Article
III cases.
III.

WARRANTS

Pfander and Birk also offer warrants as an example of original noncontentious litigation in the federal courts.83 Courts and magistrates
generally issue warrants without the participation of the person whose
property or liberty may be impaired. As is true for in rem proceedings,
warrant practice reflects a need to affect adverse interests that cannot easily
be adjusted by agreement between the parties—here, the government and
the target. The obvious justification for proceeding ex parte is that notice to

forward to contest the petition for remission.” Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1366–67, 1366 nn.74–
76, 1367 n.77.
80
The Princess of Orange, 19 F. Cas. 1336, 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1831) (No. 11,431) (rejecting, in a
proceeding under the Act of March 3, 1797, the government’s argument that the collector could not
oppose the remission, when the government was supporting the claim for remission so that the seized
jewels could be returned to King of the Netherlands from whom they were stolen).
81
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 407.
82
Id. at 428–29; see also The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 722–23 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 9,072)
(indicating remission could not apply as to an importation occurring after the passage of the act
authorizing remissions).
83
Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1375, 1441.
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the target may make the goods or the person harder to secure.84 The lack of
a requirement of advance notice to the target is an aspect of procedural due
process in this context; it is not about the lack of adverse interests.
The absence of notice, moreover, was generally soon remedied. As
shown by Telford Taylor, after issuance of the warrant, its execution
generally gave immediate notice to the target, and frequently led to
immediate adverse arguments.85 For example, the victim of a theft might
swear out a complaint stating probable cause to believe that stolen goods
would be found in a particular place.86 If the goods were found, both the
goods and the suspect were brought immediately before the judge. The
search target could argue that the goods were in fact his own and should be
restored to him.87 Similarly, in early twentieth-century federal cases,
persons whose goods were seized could move for their return, either as part
of a criminal action if they were already defendants or in a separate
proceeding.88 Arrest warrants also give notice to the arrestee upon their
execution and give rise to adversary determinations of the legality of
detention and, eventually, of criminal liability.
To support their claim of a lack of adverseness as to warrants, Pfander
and Birk cite the fact that historically “a lawful warrant” would have the
effect of providing a defense to the searching individuals if the search

84

See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 765 (1994)
(indicating that an ex parte warrant for contraband, criminal instrumentalities, and other dangerous
items “could issue, without notice to the owner of the place, lest he be tipped off and spirit away the
goods, or lest the items cause imminent harm”); cf. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 59–60 (noting that search
warrants can be used to find incriminating evidence, whereas a subpoena to the defendant requiring him
to turn over the same evidence would run into Fifth Amendment problems).
85
TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 82 (“Temporary restraining order and search warrant differ in that the
initial clandestinity is a necessary feature only of the latter, but they are alike in the far more basic
respect that both are ancillary ex parte preludes to confrontation and controversy.”); see also Amar,
supra note 84, at 803 (noting that in the past, notice was “contemporaneous with the intrusion”).
86
Cf. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 44–45 (indicating that stolen goods warrants were common for
much of the nineteenth century, but began to fade with the appearance of the exclusionary rule and
organized police forces).
87
Cf. Halsted v. Brice, 13 Mo. 171, 175 (1850) (in a trespass action, holding that the warrant
should not have been admitted as to ownership of the seized tools, given that the warrant was informal
and insufficient). Many of the warrant cases used as authority in this section, including Halsted, were
cited by Taylor. See TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 44 & 188 n.71, 86 & 202 n.194.
88
See, e.g., Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 223–25 (1929) (noting the use of motions in
advance of trial for return of the property and suppression of the evidence); id. at 225–27 (discussing
independent proceedings for return of evidence, as by a stranger to the litigation, or where the criminal
proceeding has been disposed of, or after acquittal); id. at 227–28 (indicating that motions made by
defendants pretrial for suppression were generally interlocutory and not immediately appealable).
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victim sued them in trespass.89 To be sure, legal warrants often supplied a
defense to trespass actions and thus could limit contestation by way of such
post-search actions. Even a warrant lawfully issued on a showing of
probable cause, however, did not necessarily give a defense to the
complainant on a stolen goods warrant if no stolen goods were found.90
Contests occurred, moreover, as to whether warrants were indeed lawful.
Trespass defendants could be liable if probable cause and good faith were
absent91 or if there were inadequate descriptions of places and goods.92 In
all events, contests seeking return of property were available.93
89

Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1375–76; see also Amar, supra note 84, at 774 (indicating that
if there was no warrant accompanying a search, the target could have a trespass suit); id. at 781
(indicating that if a warrant was issued from a court of general jurisdiction, the determination of
probable cause would be treated as res judicata and could only be questioned by a higher court).
90
See, e.g., Chipman v. Bates, 15 Vt. 51, 58–61 (1843) (noting there was a dispute as to whether
the complainant on a stolen goods warrant was strictly liable for trespass as the goods were not
recovered, but finding that the open door meant there was no liability); Beaty v. Perkins, 6 Wend. 382,
383–86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831) (noting some English cases indicating that the informer on a stolen goods
warrant could be strictly liable if no goods were found, but holding that the officer and the complainant
could defend as the warrant was legally issued and executed); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering
the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 589, 652 (1999) (discussing potential tort
liability for private parties and officers who acted as complainants on warrants in the event of a fruitless
search); id. at 626–27 (discussing the extent to which a warrant justified the executing officer’s
actions); id. at 652–53, 653 n.295 (noting that customs officers sometimes had protection from seizures
which were later overturned by a court if they had reasonable cause). As Davies points out, officers
might act as complaining witnesses and could be liable on the same terms as private complainants, who
might be liable for a fruitless search despite a lawful warrant. See id. at 652 (“Moreover, an officer who
initiated a revenue search was as accountable as a private complainant.”). But cf. Pfander & Birk Reply,
supra note 9, at 1083 (“[P]ossible spin-off claims do not alter the fact that the constable could claim
legal protection from a trespass action when acting pursuant to a lawful warrant.”).
Exceeding the scope of the warrant could similarly lead to liability. See, e.g., Larthet v. Forgay,
2 La. Ann. 524 (1847) (affirming a judgment of liability for detaining a tobacconist and searching his
shop, which was next to the cabaret specified in the warrant); Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464, 472 (1850)
(indicating that both the complaining witness and sheriff could be liable when the warrant commanded
the search of the dwelling house of the individual leasing the premises to the plaintiff, but not the
dwelling of the plaintiff himself).
91
This was particularly true for the complaining witnesses. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
340–41, 341 n.3 (1986) (“In 1871, the generally accepted rule was that one who procured the issuance
of an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint could be held liable if the complaint was made
maliciously and without probable cause.”); id. at 344–45 (holding that a police officer whose warrant
application resulted in an arrest alleged to be unconstitutional was only entitled to qualified immunity,
which would be lost in the absence of probable cause); Randall v. Henry, 5 Stew. & P. 367, 378 (Ala.
1834) (noting that in a malicious prosecution case, the fact that the magistrate issued the warrant did not
constitute an excuse if there was malice and no probable cause); Carey v. Sheets, 67 Ind. 375, 375–76,
378 (1879) (finding that while the constable could justify his actions under the warrant, those who
procured the warrant could be liable for malicious prosecution if there were both want of probable
cause and malice); Bell v. Keepers, 14 P. 542, 543 (Kan. 1887) (indicating that the person who swore
out a complaint leading to the issuance of an arrest warrant could be liable if there was malice and no
probable cause).
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It is true that modern surveillance warrants are problematic from an
Article III case or controversy requirement, as Taylor argued, because
revelation and possible adverse contest will be delayed if they occur at all.94
National security orders are particularly likely to escape eventual notice
and adverse contests.95 This Article does not enter the debate about the
legality of such national security orders.96 Traditional warrants, however,
not only affected adverse legal interests but also generally gave notice and
an opportunity for adverse argument. In summary, warrants presented a
need for a determination of adverse legal interest that could not be resolved
voluntarily, a need for a pre-notice determination of whether the warrant
should issue, and a post-execution ability to contest at least some aspects of
the warrant’s validity.

92

See Reed v. Rice, 25 Ky. (2 J.J. Marsh) 44, 45–47 (1829) (holding that although those
summoned to assist would not be held liable for trespass, the complainant and the constable executing
the warrant could be liable given the lack of an adequate description of the place to be searched as
required by the Kentucky constitution); Barker v. Stetson, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 53, 54 (1856) (stating that
if the warrant for seizure was issued under an unconstitutional statute, both the magistrate and the
officer could be liable in trespass); Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. (13 Tyng) 286, 288–89 (1816)
(indicating the defendant revenue inspectors could have been liable because the warrant was not
specific enough as to the persons whose houses were to be searched and goods that were the object of
the search); id. at 289–90 (indicating that the damages might be slight because only forfeitable goods
were taken); id. at 288–89 (indicating that the failure to attach the complaint did not vitiate a warrant,
while also stating that if the warrant did not state any sufficient cause it would not justify the entry); cf.
Davies, supra note 90, at 647–48 (providing authority that success of the search was not necessarily
sufficient justification for violation of the home). Pfander and Birk do note that overbroad warrants did
not confer immunity. Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1376 n.127.
93
See TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 48 (stating that there is an opportunity to quash the warrant and
seek restoration of the property seized, although this provides little protection if nothing is seized, with
trespass actions being “a very forlorn hope”); id. at 82 (stating that the return on the warrant provides an
immediate opportunity to move to suppress the warrant and seek return of seized items).
94
Id. at 79–88 (criticizing procedures for surveillance warrants, and noting problems as to “case or
controversy” criteria including the lack of adverse parties).
95
Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1463 (noting the problem that targets may lack notice); see also
id. at 1349 n.3, 1462–65 (discussing debate over FISA warrants). Congress in 2015 provided for the
appointment of attorneys to serve as amicus curiae in the FISA court, under rules of the presiding
judges, to provide as appropriate, inter alia, “legal arguments that advance the protection of individual
privacy and civil liberties.” USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401(i)(1), (i)(4)(A),
129 Stat. 268, 279 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(1), (i)(4)(A) (2015)).
96
See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and Article III, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1161 (2015) (raising questions as to the constitutionality of certain FISA procedures); Jack Goldsmith,
Internal Checks and Balances in the National Security Agency, JACK GOLDSMITH (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://jackgoldsmith.org/internal-checks-balances-national-security-agency/
[https://perma.cc/762PYBJR] (discussing the necessity for secrecy, and that internal checks try “to replicate in secret the role
that checks and balances normally play in public”).
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IV.

COLLUSIVE SUITS

Pfander and Birk provide some examples of non-contentious
jurisdiction as to which the Court expressed criticism and declined
jurisdiction—particularly collusive suits where the parties had, in some
sense, cooperated in seeking a decision from the courts. They claim,
however, that “the decisions that restrict the use of collusive cases do not
actually question the power of the federal courts to hear non-contentious
proceedings in general, but only collusive proceedings that assume the
form of contentious ones.”97 Their examples include Lord v. Veazie98 and
friendly shareholder litigation.99 Further exploration of these cases,
however, reinforces a general requirement of adverse interests.
Any assessment of collusive suits requires distinguishing instances in
which the parties lacked genuinely adverse legal interests (hereinafter
“merits collusion”) and cases where the parties had adverse legal interests
but colluded primarily to set up a cause of action and obtain jurisdiction in
the lower federal courts or in the Supreme Court (hereinafter “jurisdictional
collusion”).100 Examples of both can be found in early Supreme Court
practice. Fletcher v. Peck101 presents an example of merits collusion, where
parties without genuine adverse interests set up a case to secure a decision
to uphold the Yazoo land grants.102 Hylton v. United States, which upheld a
federal carriage tax,103 appears to be more a case of jurisdictional collusion,
where parties with $16 in controversy alleged with obvious falsity that over
97

Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1433; see also id. at 1435 (describing the reprobated cases as
those that “aim[] to secure a precedent rather than to resolve a dispute”).
98
49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850); Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1433.
99
Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1436–37; id. at 1437–38, 1440 (arguing that a principal concern
as to friendly disputes regarding constitutional issues was that the parties could not be relied on to
develop an adequate record).
100
Lindsay G. Robertson, “A Mere Feigned Case”: Rethinking the Fletcher v. Peck Conspiracy
and Early Republican Legal Culture, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 249, 259 (“Feigned issues, like legal fictions,
had developed in England to provide a means around jurisdictional impediments in a restrictive
pleading environment.”); see Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829,
1838–39 (2007) (discussing heavy reliance on pleadings, and cases where the Court held that a party
had waived the lack of diversity by not raising it, and how parties could collude to have their case tried
in federal court by a combination of a plaintiff’s jurisdictional plea and defendant’s non-objection); id.
at 1839–41 (discussing procedural roadblocks to contesting subject matter jurisdiction); cf. Pfander &
Birk, supra note 9, at 1434–35 (noting that early feigned cases could be somewhat like modern
declaratory judgments and were trying to assure a federal forum for a resolution of a real dispute). The
categories of merits and jurisdictional collusion will not always be perfectly distinct.
101
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
102
Robertson, supra note 100, at 252–56. There may also have been jurisdictional collusion as to
the amount in controversy. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 344–45.
103
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175, 181 (1796).
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$2000 was in controversy to meet a requirement for Supreme Court
review.104 Merits collusion, where adverse legal interests are lacking, is a
more serious challenge to adverseness requirements than jurisdictional
collusion. The Court, however, dismissed neither Fletcher nor Hylton
based on the cooperation of the parties.
Over time, however, the Supreme Court backed away from
countenancing merits collusion, resulting in part from an increasing
willingness to look beyond the face of the pleadings to determine
justiciability and jurisdictional questions.105 In Lord v. Veazie, the Court
dismissed a suit between two parties effectively seeking a determination
that a nonparty bank did not own certain navigation rights in the Penobscot
River.106 Chief Justice Roger Taney stated as to the parties, “it is evident
that their interest in the question brought here for decision is one and the
same, and not adverse . . . .”107 Chief Justice Taney distinguished amicable
cases where the parties will, “for the purpose of obtaining a decision of the
controversy, . . . mutually admit facts which they know to be true.”108 He
explained “there must be an actual controversy, and adverse interests. The
amity consists in the manner in which it is brought to issue before the
court.”109
The Court similarly dismissed Wood-Paper Co. v. Heft for the lack of
adverse interests.110 In that case, a patent holder brought an infringement
action which was dismissed by the lower court. The plaintiff patent holder
then purchased the competing patent and sought by appeal to have the trial
104

DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
1798–1888, at 32 (1985) (characterizing the Court’s willingness to decide Hylton as “extraordinary”);
Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the
Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 613 n.173 (noting the transparent effort to get
around the jurisdictional amount and the fact that “the United States had apparently paid Hylton’s
attorneys”); Robertson, supra note 100, at 262–63 (discussing Hylton, as well as Pennington v. Coxe,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33 (1804), which also contested a tax).
105
See Collins, supra note 100, at 1861–70 (discussing the Taney Court’s decreasing reliance on
the face of the pleadings to determine subject matter jurisdiction).
106
49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 254–56 (1850).
107
Id. at 254; see also Morley, supra note 7, at 657–64 (discussing Veazie and other cases where
the parties were seeking the same relief).
108
Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 255.
109
Id.; cf. 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
TANEY PERIOD 1836–64, at 538 (1974) (indicating that in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539
(1842), the Pennsylvania legislature arranged for a trial with a special verdict against Prigg, so that a
constitutional challenge to the Pennsylvania statute as to fugitive slaves could reach the Supreme
Court); id. at 602 (discussing how the parties in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856),
cooperated to shape the case for an appeal to the Supreme Court); id. at 601 (providing facts indicating
there was a genuine dispute between Scott and Sanford).
110
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 333, 336 (1869).
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court’s decision overturned with an apparent aim to prejudice parties in
other patent litigation.111
Its increased willingness to look beyond the pleadings sometimes led
the Court to reject cases involving jurisdictional collusion.112 Nevertheless,
the Court remained amenable to many forms of jurisdictional collusion.
Indeed, the Taney Court, which decided Veazie and Heft, approved the use
of shareholder derivative actions as a means for corporations to obtain
federal diversity jurisdiction for challenges to allegedly unconstitutional
state laws. If incorporated in a particular state, a corporation would not be
diverse from that state’s enforcement officials. The corporation therefore
faced problems in attempting to bring a federal court suit against state
officers, particularly before general federal question jurisdiction was
available.113 In Dodge v. Woolsey, however, the Court allowed an out-ofstate shareholder to bring a derivative action against the in-state
corporation in federal court to contest the corporation’s paying a tax
alleged to violate the Contracts Clause.114 The shareholder suit would
become a staple of constitutional challenges, as would similar suits by
corporate bond trustees.115
Such shareholder and trustee suits seeking injunctions against the
corporation’s compliance with unconstitutional laws were, for the most

111

See id. at 334 (statement of the case, describing allegations of the intervenor that the suit “was
now carried on without the appellees having any further interest in the defence, and for the purpose of
obtaining the decree of this court in favor of the complainants to influence suits pending in the circuits
in their favor and against strangers to this suit, . . . and that the intervenor was a defendant in one of
these suits”).
112
See, e.g., Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 134–35 (1873) (affirming the decree
from the state court upholding the constitutionality of a state prohibition law, but refusing to decide the
constitutionality of the application of such a law to liquor owned prior to passage of the law, given that
it was unlikely that the ownership extended back to 1851 when the liquor law had first been passed); id.
at 135 (reasoning that the plaintiff could not have proven the facts necessary for the claim and that the
Iowa Supreme Court did not consider it an issue raised by the record); Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Sav.
Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Tr. Co., 197 U.S. 178, 180 (1905) (realigning the company as a plaintiff
and thereby destroying diversity in a contract suit, where the suit was an attempt to avoid the effect of a
prior decision against the company in the state supreme court); id. at 181 (finding no Contracts Clause
issue that would sustain federal question jurisdiction); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 303–04
(1943) (per curiam) (dismissing where the landowner had engineered a friendly suit with a tenant who
did not actually participate, to contest a federal price control act, although it was not alleged that any
false allegation was made, and although the United States had intervened to defend the act).
113
See Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies,
107 YALE L.J. 77, 90 (1997) (discussing potential obstacles faced by the corporation or shareholders
attempting to obtain diversity to challenge government action in federal courts).
114
59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 356–61 (1855); see also Woolhandler, supra note 113, at 91 (discussing
Dodge).
115
Woolhandler, supra note 113, at 95–98, 97 n.104, 98 n.110.
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part, genuinely contentious, despite the lack of adversity between the
shareholders and the corporation. Along with the corporation, in-state
government enforcement officials were also party defendants.116 The
shareholders’ and corporation’s interests were adverse to the interests of
the enforcement official.
It is true that the Court in Hawes v. Oakland announced that it was
promulgating an equity rule requiring an affidavit from the plaintiff that
“the suit is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the United States
jurisdiction in a case of which it could otherwise have no cognizance.”117
The Court, however, often applied the rule leniently—allowing a suit, for
example, where the disagreement alleged between the shareholders and
directors was that the directors had declined to file suit because of
“embarrassments” to the corporation’s raising its rights in state court.118
While the Court continued to entertain numerous shareholder and trustee
suits into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,119 such suits
116

See, e.g., Dodge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 336 (“[The plaintiff] makes George C. Dodge, the tax
collector, the directors of the bank, and the bank itself, defendants.”). Pfander and Birk note the Court’s
expressions of misgivings about friendly suits, such as in Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892), a case between a railroad passenger and a railroad in the state trial court.
See Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1436 & n.418. In Wellman, however, the plaintiff had not joined a
government official in the trial court. See 143 U.S. at 344. The Supreme Court noted that the
government had appeared in the Michigan Supreme Court, id., and the United States Supreme Court
went on to affirm the judgment below holding that the rate regulation was valid. Id. at 346; cf. Atherton
Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13, 15–16 (1922) (noting that this case differed from Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S 33, 38 (1915), in that the plaintiff challenging a labor act had failed to join a government
official as a party, but ultimately holding the case moot because the child laborer had aged out of the
act’s coverage).
117
104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881); see Equity Rule 94, 104 U.S. ix, ix–x (1882) (enacting nearly
identical language); see also John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative
Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 266 (1981)
(treating Hawes as indicating a policy to move away from a disreputable form of litigation).
118
Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13, 15–16 (1881); see Woolhandler, supra note 113, at 97
& n.101 (discussing Greenwood on this point).
119
See, e.g., Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 154 U.S. 362, 388–93 (1894) (entertaining a suit
by an out-of-state trustee on railroad bonds contesting allegedly unreasonable rates); Smyth v. Ames,
169 U.S. 466, 469–70 (1898) (statement of the case, indicating that diverse shareholders sued the
corporations and state officers); Woolhandler, supra note 113, at 128 (noting continued use of diversity
for raising constitutional challenges, even after 1875). Even when litigants relied on federal question as
a basis for jurisdiction, they continued to use the shareholder suit for some time. See Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 143–45 (1908) (indicating in a shareholder case that there was no claim of diversity
jurisdiction, and upholding the suit as a federal question case); see also Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr.
Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199–202 (1921) (upholding federal question jurisdiction in a shareholder action
challenging a bank’s investments in bonds alleged to have been issued in excess of congressional
power); Woolhandler, supra note 113, at 97 n.104 (suggesting that the shareholder form may have
helped in showing inadequacy of remedies at law for acquiring equity jurisdiction). The requirements as
to adversity do not appear to have been more stringent in diversity “controversies” than in the federal
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eventually fell from use with the rise of anticipatory federal question
actions.120
Similarly evidencing the Court’s willingness to allow jurisdictional
collusion were equity receiverships.121 Receiverships, as noted above, were
a means to adjust the debts of insolvent corporations.122 Diversity
jurisdiction would be obtained in federal court by using a diverse creditor
to initiate the proceeding, usually based on enforcement of creditors’ rights
in some form.123 Through appointment of ancillary receivers in different
federal courts, a federal court receivership could protect and reorganize
assets throughout the country.124 By contrast, state insolvency proceedings
and foreclosures could generally only reach assets and creditors within the
state.
Such cooperation did not mean that the creditor was giving up his
claims, nor that the parties lacked adverse legal interests. As the Court
stated in rejecting a challenge to a receivership initiated by a cooperative
diverse creditor:
It does appear that the parties to the suit desired that the administration of the
railway affairs should be taken in hand by the Circuit Court of the United
States, and to that end, when the suit was brought, the defendant admitted the
averments in the bill and united in the request for the appointment of
receivers. This fact is stated by the Circuit Judge; but there is no claim made
that the averments in the bill were untrue, or that the debts, named in the bill
as owing to the complainants, did not in fact exist; nor is there any question
question “cases.” Compare Smith, 255 U.S. at 195–96 (federal question case in which the facts suggest
a genuine disagreement with the directors), with Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 79,
113 (1901) (holding in a diversity shareholder suit that the directors’ agreeing with the shareholders as
to the unconstitutionality of the statute, but declining to challenge it based on prudential reasons, did not
undermine jurisdiction).
120
Cf. Collins, supra note 100, at 1849 & n.80 (noting cases realigning parties after federal
question jurisdiction was available).
121
See Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1386 (discussing receiverships).
122
See supra text accompanying notes 46–47.
123
See Byrne, supra note 48, at 77 (indicating that proceedings were generally initiated by a
general creditor, “at the suggestion of the railroad,” by filing “a bill in behalf of himself and all other
creditors, against the company in the proper” federal court); id. at 82 (indicating that a creditor who was
not a citizen of the same state as any defendant would file the creditor’s bill); cf. Paul D. Cravath, The
Reorganization of Corporations; Bondholders’ and Stockholders’ Protective Committees;
Reorganization Committees; and the Voluntary Recapitalization of Corporations, in SOME LEGAL
PHASES, supra note 48, at 153, 155 (indicating that corporate reorganizations generally follow and are
based on foreclosure of mortgages or enforcement of creditors rights in some form). Alternatively, the
corporation itself might initiate the proceeding. See Byrne, supra note 48, at 82, 85–88 (indicating that
beginning in 1884, federal courts allowed corporate initiation, although Byrne thought a creditor’s bill
preferable).
124
See Cravath, supra note 123, at 158–59, 213 (discussing benefits of federal receiverships for
preserving property).
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made as to the citizenship of the complainants . . . . That the parties preferred
to take the subject matter of the litigation into the Federal courts, instead of
proceeding in one of the courts of the State, is not wrongful.125

The Court’s abjuring merits collusion in cases such as Veazie and
Heft,126 as well as its countenancing a certain amount of jurisdictional
collusion in shareholder suits and receiverships, both manifest the need for
adverse interests to be at stake.
Some instances where jurisdictional collusion resulted in dismissal
further reinforce an adverse interest requirement. In these cases, the parties
in some sense had genuine adverse interests and thus were not engaged in
merits collusion, but those adverse interests were not directly at stake in the
particular case brought before the Court, such that the Court dismissed the
cases.
For example, the Court dismissed San Mateo County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Co.127 and California v. San Pablo & Tulare Railroad
Co.128 for lack of legal interests that would be affected. In both cases, the
taxpayers and tax collectors cooperated in presenting test cases as to the
legality of state taxes.129 The governments sued for taxes in state court, and
the railroad defendants removed the cases under then-existing federal
question removal provisions. In San Mateo County, however, the railroad
had unconditionally paid the taxes and agreed that the taxes would not be
refunded even if the railroad won, such that there would be no difference in
the result of the particular tax collection suit if the law were declared
unconstitutional.130 Similarly, in San Pablo & Tulare Railroad, the Court
found that the railroad had tendered the tax in such a way as to extinguish
the state’s claim according to state law.131 The California Attorney General
argued that the case should be decided on the merits because it was a test
case implicating several other cases and that the case should not be

125

See In re Metro. Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S. 90, 110–11 (1908).
Veazie was a diversity case. Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 252 (1850) (action on a
covenant). Heft arose under the patent jurisdiction. Wood-Paper Co. v. Heft, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 333, 334
(1869) (bill to enjoin patent infringement); see supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text.
127
116 U.S. 138, 141–42 (1885).
128
149 U.S. 308, 313–14 (1893).
129
Federal injunctions against state taxes could be somewhat harder to obtain than other
injunctions, see Woolhandler, supra note 113, at 134, 143, even before the 1937 Tax Injunction Act.
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
130
116 U.S. at 139–41.
131
149 U.S. at 313–14; see also Little v. Bowers, 134 U.S. 547, 556 (1890) (dismissing a similar
case because payment had been “in the nature of a compromise” and extinguished the controversy
between the parties).
126
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dismissed because payments were still owed in those other cases.132 The
Court, however, required adverse legal interests to be at stake in the very
case.133
The Court reached a similar result in Muskrat v. United States,
holding that Congress improperly authorized particular causes of action to
serve as test cases.134 A 1902 statute provided for the distribution of certain
Cherokee lands and funds to those enrolled in the tribe as of September 1,
1902.135 Subsequent legislation, however, extended the allotment rights to
minor children of enrolled tribe members living on the land as of March 4,
1906.136 In a still-later statute, Congress authorized a suit against the United
States by certain named plaintiffs representing those enrolled as of
September 1, 1902 to challenge the constitutionality of the law adding to
the enrollment.137 The Court, however, refused to hear the case because the
legislatively authorized suit would not affect adverse legal interests:
It is true the United States is made a defendant to this action, but it has no
interest adverse to the claimants. The object is not to assert a property right as
against the Government, or to demand compensation for alleged wrongs
because of action upon its part. . . . Such judgment will not conclude private
parties, when actual litigation brings to the court the question of the
constitutionality of such legislation.138

132

San Pablo, 149 U.S. at 312–13; see also San Mateo County, 116 U.S. at 141 (responding to the
objection that it was a test case).
133
San Pablo, 149 U.S. at 314; see also San Mateo County, 116 U.S. at 141–42 (dismissing the
writ of error for “the reason that there is no longer an existing cause of action in favor of the county
against the railroad company,” and noting that the issues could be decided in another pending case).
The Court’s current mootness doctrine, however, is often more forgiving than these cases were. See
infra note 139.
134
219 U.S. 346, 360–63 (1911).
135
Act of Jul. 1, 1902, ch. 1375, § 24, 30, 32 Stat. 716, 720–21.
136
Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 2, 34 Stat. 137, 137–38, amended by Act of June 21, 1906, ch.
3504, 34 Stat. 325, 341–42. The April 26, 1906 Act also extended certain prohibitions on alienation. Id.
§ 19, 34 Stat. at 144. Another statute, Act of Mar. 11, 1904, ch. 505, 33 Stat. 65, allowed the Secretary
of the Interior to grant rights of way for pipelines over lands allotted to Indians. These additional
restrictions on the land were at issue in Brown v. United States, which was decided in tandem with
Muskrat v. United States. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 349.
137
Act of Mar. 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015, 1028; Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 349–51, 360.
138
Mustkrat, 219 U.S. at 361–62. The Court ultimately decided the issues in a suit that sought to
enjoin the Secretaries of Interior and Treasury from performing duties under the act. Gritts v. Fisher,
224 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1912), aff’g 37 App. D.C. 473 (1911); see 37 App. D.C. at 476 (noting
allegations that the Secretary had allotted and was about to allot lands to persons born since September
1, 1902); cf. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 362 (noting the pendency of the other suit at the time Congress
passed the 1907 suit-authorizing legislation, but saying that the suit-authorizing legislation “must
depend upon its own terms and be judged by the authority which it undertakes to confer”); id. (“The
questions involved in this proceeding as to the validity of the legislation may arise in suits between
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In summary, the Court’s treatment of collusive cases generally
demonstrates its insistence that adverse legal interests be at issue in the
case. The Court refused to hear merits collusion cases such as Veazie where
the parties lacked genuinely adverse interests. On the other hand, the Court
countenanced much jurisdictional collusion, as in shareholder actions and
receiverships, where adverse legal interests were at stake. But even where
the parties were innocent of reprobated merits collusion, as in the railroad
tax cases, the Court wanted those adverse interests at least to be at stake in
the case before it.139
individuals, and when they do and are properly brought before this court for consideration they, of
course, must be determined in the exercise of its judicial functions.”).
139
The mootness doctrine requires, at least in theory, that parties on both sides of a dispute
maintain a personal stake throughout the litigation, in addition to having such a stake at the outset as
required by standing doctrine. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709–11 (2011) (holding moot
a case challenging the constitutionality of officers’ interviewing a child without parental permission or a
warrant, because the child was almost eighteen and had moved out of the district); cf. Kingdomware
Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1975–76 (2016) (holding that a case involving short-term
contracts was not moot, in part because there was “a reasonable expectation that the same complaining
party [will] be subject to the same action again” (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998));
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 203 (7th ed. 2015) (suggesting that more recent cases look for recurrence as to the same party).
The Court, however, has sometimes allowed even a low probability of the same parties’ having the
same adverse interests in the future to save a case from mootness. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,
529 U.S. 277, 287–89 (2000) (finding the case not moot where a nude dancing establishment that had
obtained an injunction was now out of business but might possibly resume operation); Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305, 318–20 (1988) (as to a question under a federal act entitling handicapped children to an
appropriate education, holding the claim moot as to a twenty-four-year-old who had aged out of the
act’s protections, but not moot as to a twenty-year-old student who was still within the act’s protections,
although he was not currently in the school system).
Class suits can rely on the interests of class members to keep a case from mootness, but questions
remain as to the extent class members’ interests count pre-certification. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 110–11 n.11 (1975) (holding a case not moot where the named plaintiff’s claim was
currently moot, and may have been moot prior to certification); cf. Campbell–Ewald Co. v. Gomez,
136 S. Ct. 663, 670–72 (2016) (holding that the named plaintiff’s claim in a not-yet-certified class was
not mooted by an unaccepted offer of all relief to which he would individually be entitled); Meltzer,
supra note 8, at 309–11 (discussing whether class status changes justiciability). One might see the
federal courts’ continuing jurisdiction to entertain cases on the edge of mootness as derivative of the
courts’ having obtained jurisdiction of a case meeting the more stringent requirements of standing (and
hence of adverse interests) at the outset. See Sidney A. Diamond, Federal Jurisdiction to Decide Moot
Cases, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 137–38 (1946) (expressing disfavor as to a public interest factor in
mootness, but noting that it is sometimes used “as a ground for retaining a jurisdiction which had
properly attached at the commencement of the litigation”); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 26
(1984) (“[T]he personal interest needed to defeat mootness may be different from, and less than, that
required initially to establish, standing.”); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda
Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668–69 (2012) (indicating that the Supreme
Court is more liberal in its justiciability doctrines when its own docket is concerned). But cf. Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384–85 (1973)
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V.

PENSIONS AND CITIZENSHIP

A number of Pfander and Birk’s examples of non-contentious
jurisdiction, as discussed above, in fact manifested adverseness. In remtype proceedings required the determination of adverse interests in
situations where impediments often existed to voluntary extrajudicial
resolution. Service or notice in some form was generally provided, which
gave opportunities for adverse argument.140 Warrants similarly affected
adverse interests not readily amenable to voluntary extrajudicial resolution,
with notice generally occurring upon seizure of the person or thing, and
with potential opportunities for adverse argument thereafter.141 The results
in the collusion cases further support the requirement of parties in the
action with adverse interests on the merits.142
Two of the authors’ examples of non-contentious jurisdiction,
however, do not so readily suggest adverse interests—ex parte
determinations of pensions143 and of citizenship.144 To be sure, one could
argue that in these proceedings the government held the opposing interests
and had more or less issued a blanket default on behalf of the
government.145 On the other hand, these cases generally lacked any form of
notice or service, even by publication or seizure.146 Such claims also lacked
impediments to a voluntary extrajudicial resolution.147 The Executive can
generally give a claimant a benefit under statutory criteria without
obtaining a judgment. If the Executive denies a benefit, an adverse
proceeding may then ensue between the claimant and the government.
Nevertheless, the pension and naturalization examples provide little
support for doing away with an adverseness requirement. As discussed

(discussing arguments that the personal stake requirement, or lack thereof, should be the same as to
standing and mootness); Lee, supra note 8, at 605 (arguing that mootness doctrines are
subconstitutional). For further discussions of mootness, see sources cited supra note 8.
140
See supra Part II.
141
See supra Part III.
142
See supra Part IV.
143
Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1364.
144
Id. at 1361.
145
This is Caleb Nelson’s view. See supra note 31.
146
Cf. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 49 (1852) (discussing why the district
court’s determination of certain treaty claims was not Article III business, and noting that the district
attorney had no right to appear in the proceedings, although presumably he would have a duty as a
public officer to object to the judge if he knew of a problem); Nelson, supra note 1, at 1570 (“In
personal actions, then, a common-law court could proceed to judgment against a defendant only if the
defendant either actually appeared or at least was given a valid command to appear, and was thereby
brought within the court’s power.”).
147
See supra text accompanying notes 34–45 (discussing situations where such impediments exist).
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below, the Court treated federal judges’ pension determinations as
appropriate, if at all, as the work of individual commissioners rather than
Article III judges. Naturalization petitions are perhaps Pfander and Birk’s
best example of non-contentious jurisdiction, but the Court explicitly
approved the practice as appropriate under Article III only after provisions
for notice to, and potential appearance by, the United States.
A.

Revolutionary War Pensions

1. Hayburn’s Case.—Under a 1792 statute, Congress gave the
federal courts the task of making certain ex parte pension determinations
with respect to Revolutionary War veterans which then could be reviewed
by the Secretary of War and Congress.148 Circuit justices and judges
complained to the President that the proceedings were not of a judicial
nature and that the Secretary of War and Congress could modify the
judges’ determinations. The court reporter attached these communications
to the report of Hayburn’s Case,149 but the Court did not decide the merits
of these objections in Hayburn. For a short time thereafter, some judges
continued to perform the work as commissioners rather than as Article III
judges. In United States v. Yale Todd in 1794, however, the Court, without
publishing an opinion, held invalid the judges’ work as commissioners
under the 1792 Act.150
Given that the judges’ objected to pension work and claimed to
perform such work only as commissioners, the Revolutionary pensions
example would seem to provide little support for treating ex parte benefits
determinations as Article III cases. Pfander and Birk nevertheless treat the
pension example as supporting their claims that Article III judges, as such,
can decide non-contentious cases.151 They argue that the judges’ objections
were primarily directed to the political branches’ review of judges’ pension
determinations, rather than to the nonadversarial nature of the
proceedings.152
148

Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243.
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1792).
150
See Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 52–53 (discussing the unreported case of United States v.
Yale Todd); Wilfred J. Ritz, United States v. Yale Todd (U.S. 1794), 15 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 220,
227–31 (1958) (providing the record); see also Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall’s
Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 301, 308–10 (discussing Todd). See
infra text accompanying notes 162–71 for further discussion of judges acting as commissioners.
151
See Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1364.
152
Id. at 1427–29; id. at 1429 (“On this account . . . the Pennsylvania circuit viewed the absence of
finality as the master objection and identified two other criticisms that we might today characterize as
matters of judicial dignity.”); see also Pushaw, supra note 9, at 514–16 (making a similar argument);
149
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To be sure, political branch review loomed as a large concern in the
judges’ objections, and such review alone would be sufficient to keep even
determinations of adverse claims from being Article III judicial business.153
On the other hand, and as others have noted, the Hayburn objections
encompassed a concern for the nature of the work as a distinct objection
from the concern for political branch review.154 While the Circuit Court for
the District of New York seemed to collapse the two concerns,155 the
Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania enumerated them separately:
1st. Because the business directed by this act is not of a judicial nature. . . . 2d.
Because, if, upon that business, the court had proceeded, its judgments (for its
opinions are its judgments) might, under the same act, have been revised and
controuled by the legislature, and by an officer in the executive department.156

The Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina also teased out the
separate objections:
3. That at the same time such courts cannot be warranted . . . in exercising
(even under the authority of another act) any power not in its nature judicial,
or, if judicial, not provided for upon the terms the Constitution requires. 4.
That whatever doubt may be suggested, whether the power in question is
properly of a judicial nature, yet inasmuch as the decision of the court is not
made final, but may be at least suspended in its operation by the Secretary at
War . . . this subjects the decision of the court to a mode of revision which we
consider to be unwarranted by the Constitution . . . .157

Lee, supra note 8, at 645–47 (emphasizing the post-judgment review objection). Pfander and Birk’s
claim that the objections to the pension work were not based on nonadverseness depends in part on how
convincing one finds their other examples of non-contentious jurisdiction. See Pfander & Birk, supra
note 9, at 1427 (“Perhaps the strongest evidence against an adverse-party reading of Hayburn’s Case
lies in the federal courts’ contemporary and subsequent acceptance of ex parte duties of various sorts.”).
153
See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561, 561 (1864) (without opinion,
disallowing Supreme Court review of Court of Claims judgments); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S.
697 (1885) (providing Chief Justice Taney’s draft opinion).
154
Bloch, supra note 104, at 592–94 (indicating the concern was both as to political branch review
and whether the acts were properly judicial); id. at 595 (suggesting it was impossible to know the
relative weight of these factors); Wheeler, supra note 78, at 136–37 (noting that the objection that
decisions were subject to nonjudicial review was distinct from the objection that the matters were not
properly judicial).
155
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1792) (reprinting letter to the President from
Chief Justice Jay, Justice Cushing, and District Judge Duane).
156
Id. at 411 n.† (reprinting letter to the President from Justices Wilson and Blair, and District
Judge Peters).
157
Id. at 412–13 n.† (reprinting letter to the President from Justice Iredell and District Judge
Sitgreaves); see also Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn’s Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent,
1988 WIS. L. REV. 527, 533–34 (discussing Justice Iredell’s objection that the matters were not of a
judicial nature, and that the Secretary of War’s review power was objectionable); Pfander & Birk, supra
note 9, at 1430–31 (discussing Justice Iredell’s notes, which the authors seem to treat as not particularly
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The Court later voiced similar dual objections in United States v.
Ferreira.158 Under congressional authority, district judges had determined
claims under a Spanish treaty for certain injuries to Spanish officers and
inhabitants in Florida caused by the United States Army.159 In an opinion by
Chief Justice Taney, the Court held that it could not review the district
court treaty determinations because the district judges were acting as
commissioners, not deciding cases.160 The appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court was limited to cases, and the treaty proceedings were not
Article III cases:
For there is to be no suit; no parties in the legal acceptance of the term, are to
be made—no process to issue; and no one is authorized to appear on behalf of
the United States, or to summon witnesses in the case. The proceeding is
altogether ex parte; and all that the judge is required to do, is to receive the
claim when the party presents it, and to adjust it upon such evidence as he
may have before him, or be able himself to obtain. But neither the evidence,
nor his award, are to be filed in the court in which he presides, nor recorded
there; but he is required to transmit, both the decision and the evidence upon
which he decided, to the Secretary of the Treasury; and the claim is to be paid
if the Secretary thinks it just and equitable, but not otherwise.161

Thus, in both Hayburn and Ferreira, the judges’ concerns
encompassed both the non-judicial form of the proceedings as well as
political branch review.
2.

Judges as Commissioners as Reflected in Hayburn and Other
Cases.—What should one make of the commissioner work that
was performed by the district judges in Ferreira? This Article’s discussion
of judges’ acting as commissioners is not an argument for the
constitutionality of that practice but rather to show that the practice

helpful to their claim). Pfander and Birk argue that the judges’ concerns that the pension determinations
were not of a “judicial nature” should not be read as referring to a lack of adverse parties—supposedly a
more modern concern—but rather as primarily an objection to viewing wounds. Pfander & Birk Reply,
supra note 9, at 1078. But see James Iredell, Notes on Hayburn’s Case, in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 547, 548–49 (Maeva Marcus
ed. 2007) (distinguishing the objection “Not of a Judicial nature” from the objection “Not to be
executed in a Judicial way,” and providing inspection of wounds as an example of the latter). Given that
the grist of judicial work is to decide adverse claims and that the need for adversity is not merely a
modern concern, see supra notes 1, 3, 10, the “not of a judicial nature” objection would seem to
encompass concerns for the lack of adversity. Cf. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 46–
47 (1852) (quoted as text accompanying infra note 161).
158
54 U.S. at 47.
159
Id. at 45.
160
Id. at 51–52.
161
Id. at 46–47.
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continued after Hayburn—as Russell Wheeler has shown.162 To the extent
that lower court judges’ making certain ex parte determinations was treated
as commissioner work, the practices do not undermine an adverseness
requirement for Article III cases.
In their objections to the pension work under the 1792 Act reported
with Hayburn, the judges of the Circuit Court for the District of New York
concluded they personally could do the work as commissioners.163 By
contrast, the judges of the Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina
Circuit concluded that they could not work as commissioners because the
Act only assigned the duties to the courts, and not to the judges
personally,164 who arguably could take on the work in a non-Article III
capacity. As noted above, the Court in Todd, without opinion, held the
judges’ work as commissioners under the 1792 Act invalid. Chief Justice
Taney in Ferreira attributed the Todd decision to the statute’s assigning the
work to the courts rather than to the individual judges—i.e., the same
objection that had been made by the North Carolina federal court.165
Pfander and Birk claim support for their reading of Hayburn as
limited to an objection about political branch review by noting, “In the
wake of Hayburn’s Case, . . . Congress reassigned pension duties to the
district judges on an ex parte basis.”166 Because the judges only collected
evidence that they forwarded to the Secretary of War, the authors claim that
the problem of political branch review was gone.167 They imply that, absent
executive or legislative review, the pension determinations were proper for
Article III judges as such.
Duties under the 1793 Act, however, were more readily characterized
as commissioner work rather than Article III work. The Act provided: “All
evidence relative to Invalids shall be taken upon oath or affirmation, before
the judge of the district, in which such invalids reside, or before any three
162

Wheeler, supra note 78, at 131–32.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1792); Marcus & Teir, supra note 157, at 530–31, 531 n.24
(indicating that the judges were making themselves “voluntary agents of the federal government,” and
that Congress could have asked citizens to “volunteer to collect names for the invalid pension rolls”).
164
Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 413 n.†. The Pennsylvania Circuit judges did not advert to the
commissioner option. See Marcus & Teir, supra note 157, at 531–32.
165
See CURRIE, supra note 104, at 10 (discussing that Todd may have held that judges could not
act as commissioners, or may have been based on the statutory ground that the statute authorized
“judges to act only as a court, not as commissioners”); Bloch, supra note 104, at 612 n.172 (stating it
was unclear if Todd was based on lack of statutory authorization or a constitutional prohibition on the
judges’ processing the applications in any capacity); Wheeler, supra note 78, at 138 n.74 (suggesting
that Todd was based on interpretation of the statute).
166
Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1427; see Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324.
167
Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1427 n.380.
163
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persons specially authorized by commission from the said judge.”168 This
provision did not assign the work to the “court,” but rather the judges, thus
avoiding the objection that surfaced in the North Carolina court’s letter and
that may have played a role in Todd. The fact that under the 1793 Act the
judges could “authorize[]” others “by commission” to do the work suggests
that this was commissioner business rather than Article III cases.169
In the statute at issue in Ferreira, Congress had similarly assigned
certain treaty claims to district judges, not to the courts. Chief Justice
Taney, as noted above, treated this work as commissioner work not subject
to the Supreme Court’s review, citing both the want of adverseness as well
as political branch review.170 This is not to say Chief Justice Taney was
keen on the federal district judges’ acting as commissioners. Rather, he
thought the commissioner work raised Appointments Clause issues;
presumably he was concerned that appointment as an Article III judge did
not encompass appointment as a non-Article III officer of the United
States. Because the district courts’ performance of commissioner work was
not directly before the Court, however, and would upset determinations
assumed to be concluded, the Court declined to address the issue. Chief
Justice Taney stated:
And if this be the construction of the Constitution, then as the judge
designated could not act in a judicial character as a court, nor as a
commissioner, because he was not appointed by the President, every thing that
has been done under the acts of 1823, and 1834, and 1849, would be void, and
the payments heretofore made, might be recovered back by the United States.
But this question has not been made; nor does it arise in the case. . . . and
these laws have for so many years been acted on as valid and constitutional
we do not think it proper to express an opinion upon it.171

In summary, the judges did not perform Revolutionary War pension
work as Article III judges. And to the extent the judges performed work as
commissioners, that practice does not undermine an adverseness
requirement for Article III cases.

168

Act of Feb. 28, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. at 324.
Cf. Wheeler, supra note 78, at 138 & n.76 (indicating that the 1793 Act was not due to the
judges’ objections but rather to the fact that the judges had been too generous). Pfander and Birk seem
to reject a distinction between commissioner work and Article III work. Pfander & Birk, supra note 9,
at 1456–57. One need not accept the propriety of commissioner work, however, to recognize that it was
performed, and not treated as Article III work.
170
See supra text accompanying notes 158–61.
171
United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 51–52 (1852). Pfander and Birk argue that
Ferreira supports their claim that Hayburn should be read as a lack-of-finality case. Pfander & Birk,
supra note 9, at 1432.
169
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B.

Naturalization

Pfander and Birk also rely on citizenship determinations as an instance
of non-contentious jurisdiction.172 From an early date, Congress authorized
both state and federal “courts,” not “judges,” to grant naturalization
petitions ex parte under statutory standards, such as five years’ residence
and good character.173 Granting of citizenship petitions had been
sufficiently lax that Congress in 1906 passed a new act.174 The act, inter
alia, limited the courts that could grant such petitions175 and required clerks
of court to post notice of any petitions for citizenship176 and to send copies
of petitions to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization within thirty
days of filing.177 It also required that such proceedings be on stated days,
that at least ninety days elapse after filing and notice of the petition,178 and

172

Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1361.
See, e.g., Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414.
174
Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596. The Report to the President of the
Commission on Naturalization that preceded the legislation recounted the laxity of practices even in
many federal courts. See MILTON D. PURDY ET AL., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION
ON NATURALIZATION, H.R. DOC. NO. 59-46, at 20–22 (1905); see also id. at 86–87 (excerpting a 1904
report from the Special Examiner of the Department of Justice, which criticized the practices of federal
courts in some cities). The naturalization example thus does not suggest the wisdom of committing such
non-contentious matters to the federal courts.
175
Naturalization Act of 1906 § 3, 34 Stat. at 596.
176
Id. § 5, 34 Stat. at 598.
177
Id. § 12, 34 Stat. at 599 (“It shall also be the duty of the clerk of each of said courts . . . to
furnish to said Bureau duplicates of all petitions within thirty days after the filing of the same, and
certified copies of such other proceedings and orders instituted in or issued out of said court affecting or
relating to the naturalization of aliens as may be required from time to time by the said Bureau.”); see
also PURDY ET AL., supra note 174, at 27 (noting that the provisions of a proposed bill were defective,
“in that there was no requirement that the Federal Government should receive notice of pending
naturalizations, and such notice is absolutely necessary if the conferring of naturalization is to be
effectively safeguarded”); id. (recommending that an alien make a formal petition to the court at least
three months prior to hearing, and “it should be required that a duplicate of this petition should be sent
as soon as it is made to the bureau of naturalization”). The Nationality Act of 1940 similarly required
notice to the government. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 337(b), 54 Stat. 1137, 1158
(“It shall be the duty of the clerk of each and every naturalization court to forward to the Commissioner
a duplicate of each petition for naturalization within thirty days after the close of the month in which
such petition was filed . . . .”); id. § 333(a), 54 Stat. at 1156 (“The Commissioner . . . shall designate
members of the Service to conduct preliminary hearings upon petitions for naturalization to any
naturalization court and to make findings and recommendations thereon to such court.”). The courts
increasingly came to rely on agency recommendations, and the Immigration Act of 1990 removed “the
courts from any involvement in cases in which the agency is prepared to award citizenship.” Nancy
Morawetz, Citizenship and the Courts, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 447, 452–54; see Immigration Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 407(d)(13), 104 Stat. 4978, 5043 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1446
(2012)).
178
Naturalization Act of 1906 § 6, 34 Stat. at 598.
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that the United States have the right to appear and to be heard in
opposition.179
The United States thereafter opposed a good many naturalization
petitions.180 Parties who lost in the lower federal courts sought review in the
Circuit Courts of Appeals. While most of the appeals apparently involved
petitions that the United States had contested in the lower courts,181
sometimes even unopposed petitions that the lower court denied showed up
in the appellate courts.182 Some Courts of Appeals declined to review the
immigration determinations, whether or not in opposed proceedings, on the
ground that the petitions did not present “cases” as required for appellate
review.183
The Supreme Court considered the question of whether the citizenship
petitions presented Article III cases that could be reviewed in the Courts of
Appeals in Tutun v. United States.184 Tutun was under the 1906 Act, which
gave the United States notice and an opportunity to be heard.185 If the
government failed to appear in order to oppose the petition, the case
resembled a default in which parties with adverse legal interests may
choose not to assert their rights.186 The Court concluded that the
proceedings were sufficiently adverse to be Article III cases for appellate
review,187 reasoning that the “United States is always a possible adverse

179

Id. § 11, 34 Stat. at 599.
See, e.g., In re Centi, 217 F. 833 (W.D. Tenn. 1914) (opposed petition); see also infra note 181
(citing other opposed cases).
181
See, e.g., United States v. Poslusny, 179 F. 836 (2d Cir. 1910) (opposed); United States v.
Balsara, 180 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1910) (opposed); United States v. Rodiek, 162 F. 469 (9th Cir. 1908)
(opposed).
182
See, e.g., Harmon v. United States, 223 F. 425 (1st Cir. 1915) (not apparently opposed).
183
See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 574–75, 574 n.1, 575 n.2 (1926) (discussing the
disagreement among the circuits); see also Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828 (“That
the circuit courts of appeals established by this act shall exercise appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal or by writ of error final decision [sic] in the district court and the existing circuit courts in all
cases other than those provided for in the preceding section of this act . . . .” (emphasis added)). This
provision was reenacted in 1925. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 128(a), 43 Stat. 936, 936; see also
Tutun, 270 U.S. at 575–76 (recognizing the 1925 reenactment).
184
270 U.S. at 574. Tutun may have involved denial of an unopposed petition. See DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888–1986, at 182
(1990). The companion case, United States v. Neuberger, apparently involved an unopposed petition. In
re Neuberger, 6 F.2d 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
185
See supra notes 174–79.
186
Cf. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 237 (1912) (suggesting that the government
participation permitted by the 1906 provisions was more likely to make the proceedings adversarial).
187
See Wheeler, supra note 78, at 134 n.61 (indicating that by the time of Tutun, the government
was a potential adverse party).
180
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party. By § 11 of the Naturalization Act [of 1906] the full rights of a
litigant are expressly reserved to it.”188
In dicta, however, the Court suggested that pre-1906-Act
determinations were also cases. Justice Louis Brandeis stated,
The federal district courts, among others, have performed that function since
the Act of January 29, 1795 . . . . The constitutionality of this exercise of
jurisdiction has never been questioned. If the proceeding were not a case or
controversy within the meaning of Art. III, § 2, this delegation of power upon
the courts would have been invalid.189

One may view Justice Brandeis’s statement as somewhat analogous to
Chief Justice Taney’s failure to disturb the district judges’ treaty
commissioner work in Ferreira. In both the citizenship and treaty claims
cases, lower court judges had performed a somewhat anomalous function
for an extended period;190 the practice had been treated as constitutional,
people had relied on the determinations, and their legality was not at issue
in the case.191
To be sure, Chief Justice Marshall in Spratt v. Spratt characterized a
citizenship conferral as a “judgment” that could not be collaterally attacked
by private parties in a dispute about the descent of real estate.192 A matter,
however, could result in a “judgment”193 and be “judicial in [its] nature”
188

Tutun, 270 U.S. at 577.
Id. at 576 (citing Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 40 (1852); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)).
190
As noted in supra text accompanying notes 169–73, however, the citizenship determinations
had been assigned to the courts and the treaty determinations to the judges.
191
See Morley, supra note 7, at 668–69 (finding Tutun out of sync with the Court’s main adversity
cases, and suggesting that it may have been influenced by historical practice); cf. Wheeler, supra note
78, at 132–34 (treating the pre-1906 cases as an instance of extrajudicial business assigned to judges,
analogous to commissioner cases). A Fifth Circuit decision noted that “never until the act of 1906 has it
been suggested that the special proceedings authorized constituted a case, action, or cause that could be
reviewed on writ of error under any judiciary act, state or federal.” United States v. Dolla, 177 F. 101,
104–05 (5th Cir. 1910) (a pre-Tutun decision rejecting appeals from citizenship petitions even under the
1906 Act). In an unreported 1800 case, Ex parte Fitzbonne, a party denied citizenship obtained a
mandamus from the Supreme Court. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 9, at 1363 (citing 8 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 157, at 389–90).
192
29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 393, 408–09 (1830). Chief Justice Marshall’s statement arose in the context of a
dispute between private parties as to descent of real estate. One side argued that the decedent, contrary
to the citizenship determination, had acquired the land while still an alien, which would lead to that
side’s succeeding to the land. Id. at 400–03; see also Campbell v. Gordon, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 176, 182
(1810) (holding in an inheritance dispute that if the naturalization oath were administered, it must be
assumed the court made proper findings, and that the oath “amounts to a judgment of the court”).
193
Cf. Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561, 561 (1864) (without opinion, disallowing
Supreme Court review of Court of Claims judgments); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 699
(1885) (providing Chief Justice Taney’s draft opinion in Gordon, stating that the fact that the tribunal
189
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without being an Article III case, as Chief Justice Taney pointed out with
respect to the commissioner determinations in Ferreira.194 Insulation from
collateral attack by private parties, moreover, was not a characteristic only
of full-fledged judgments but could also attend executive grants of interests
that initially belonged to the body politic rather than to discrete
individuals.195 In a 1912 case, the Court allowed the government to attack
collaterally a pre-1906 naturalization both because the government was
more directly interested than third parties and because the pre-1906
naturalization proceedings lacked some of the attributes of normal judicial
proceedings.196 The Court stated:
An examination of this [pre-1906] legislation makes it plain that while a
proceeding for the naturalization of an alien is in a certain sense a judicial
proceeding, being conducted in a court of record and made a matter of record
therein, yet it is not in any sense an adversary proceeding. It is the alien who
applies to be admitted, who makes the necessary declaration and adduces the
requisite proofs . . . . But he is not required to make the Government a party
nor to give any notice to its representatives.
The act of June 29, 1906 . . . declares that the United States shall have the
right to appear in naturalization proceedings for the purpose of crossexamining the petitioner and the witnesses produced in support of his petition,
and shall have the right to call witnesses, produce evidence, and be heard in

was “called a court and its decisions called judgments” did not change the character of the Court of
Claims, which did not possess “judicial power in the sense in which those words are used in the
Constitution”); id. at 704 (“[The Supreme] Court has no jurisdiction in any case where it cannot render
judgment in the legal sense of the term, and when it depends upon the legislature to carry its opinion
into effect or not, at the pleasure of Congress.”).
194
54 U.S. (13 How.) at 48 (“The powers conferred by these acts of Congress upon the judge as
well as the Secretary, are, it is true, judicial in their nature. For judgment and discretion must be
exercised by both of them. But it is nothing more than the power ordinarily given by law to a
commissioner appointed to adjust claims to lands or money under a treaty . . . .”).
195
“Public rights are those that belong to the body politic,” while private rights belong to discrete
individuals. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?,
102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 693 (2004). For example, disposing of public lands is a matter of public right,
and the Land Office’s grant of a land patent could be difficult to attack in actions between private
parties. See Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 577 (2007)
(indicating that state and federal courts would have to accept certain land office determinations in later
litigation); id. at 578 (noting that a claim that the United States did not own the land it had granted
would not be foreclosed); see also Woolhandler & Nelson, supra, at 705–06 (noting limitations on
allowing private parties to enforce limits on alien landholding, although the government could raise
such claims).
Public acts embodying status determinations such as marriage may also be substantially insulated
from collateral attacks. Cf. V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1021–22 (2016) (adoption decree was entitled
to full faith and credit). Status determinations are sometimes treated as in rem. See FLEMING JAMES, JR.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.7, at 633 (1964) (“[C]ourts often reify status and give it a fictional situs.”).
196
Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 236–37 (1912).
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opposition to the granting of naturalization. No such provision was contained
in the act as it formerly stood.197

Citizenship petitions, nevertheless, are Pfander and Birk’s strongest
example of non-contentious jurisdiction. The Court referred to the
determinations as judicial, and the matters were not easily characterized as
commissioner work, at least if one assumes commissioner work had to be
assigned to judges instead of courts.198 The Court’s upholding the practice
under Article III, however, was only after the 1906 Act bolstered notice
and opportunity to be heard for the government. Overall, one would be
inclined to join other scholars in treating the practice as an outlier.199
CONCLUSION
Pfander and Birk have contributed to the appreciation of the many ex
parte matters performed by the federal courts. Their examples of in remtype proceedings and warrants, however, present a need to make conclusive
determinations of adverse legal interests that cannot readily be adjusted by
voluntary extrajudicial action. Such notice as procedural due process
required was provided, generally giving opportunities for adverse
argument. In addition, the cases involving collusion reinforce a need for
adverse interests by prohibiting merits collusion but countenancing some
forms of jurisdictional collusion so long as the parties’ genuine adverse
interests would be affected. Adverse interests are more attenuated for
pension determinations, but the federal judges objected to such work as
inconsistent with Article III, and the evidence does not support reading
those objections as limited to political branch review. Naturalization is the
authors’ strongest precedent, but the Court only explicitly approved the
courts’ performing naturalization determinations under Article III after
Congress provided for notice and opportunity to be heard by the
government. The case, therefore, has not been made for reconceptualizing
the adversity requirement for Article III cases.
197

Id. at 236–37. The 1906 Act expressly gave the government power to seek such revocation, and
the question in Johannessen was whether the United States could seek revocation even with respect to a
pre-1906 grant of citizenship. Id. at 232. The particular grant had been made by a state court. Id. The
Court held that the United States was not foreclosed from seeking revocation: “Sound reason, as we
think, constrains us to deny to a certificate of naturalization, procured ex parte in the ordinary way, any
conclusive effect as against the public.” Id. at 238.
198
But cf. Wheeler, supra note 78, at 134 (treating the citizenship petitions as not involving cases
or controversies).
199
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 139, at 86 (“When, if ever, should a deep historical pedigree
sustain a practice if the Court would otherwise find it unconstitutional?”); Morley, supra note 7, at 668–
69 (treating naturalization proceedings as an anomaly that may have been influenced by historic
practice).
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